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THE EUCLID PROVISO
Ezra Rosser*
Abstract: This Article argues that the Euclid Proviso, which allows regional concerns to
trump local zoning when required by the general welfare, should play a larger role in zoning’s
second century. Traditional zoning operates to severely limit the construction of additional
housing. This locks in the advantages of homeowners but at tremendous cost, primarily in the
form of unaffordable housing, to those who would like to join the community. State preemption
of local zoning defies traditional categorization; it is at once both radically destabilizing and
market responsive. But, given the ways in which zoning is a foundational part of the racial and
economic status quo, it is time for scholars and policymakers to move away from traditional
zoning and towards more permissive regional or state approaches to housing development.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century ago, state governments granted localities the power to
zone.1 Ever since, localities have used their zoning authority to shape
community development and to isolate themselves from neighbors.
Zoning traditionally is all about separation—residential in one area,
commercial in another, with industrial far removed—and property
investment depends in part on this separation. Through zoning, urban
planners could be sure commercial properties remained commercial even
if sold. But the central goal of zoning has always been the protection of
the single-family home (SFH).2 By protecting single-family
neighborhoods from market forces, cities use zoning’s awesome power to
favor particular communities and to disfavor others.3
For better or worse, exclusion is a core aspect of ownership.4 Owners
generally can exclude others from their property, but the exclusionary
reach of ownership extends beyond lot boundaries. Many of ownership’s
most significant advantages come from communal membership in the

1. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (recognizing zoning as a valid
exercise of state police power for the purpose of public welfare). States acted swiftly in the 1920s to
delegate zoning authority to localities based on a model promulgated by the U.S. Department of
Commerce. See ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, DEP’T OF COM., A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (rev. ed. 1926);
see also 1 SARA C. BRONIN & DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 1:2 (4th ed. 2021) (“By the 1920s, many American cities, pursuant to state enabling
statutes, had adopted comprehensive zoning codes regulating the use of land within their
boundaries.”).
2. See Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America’s Families: Control, Exclusion, and Privilege,
54 EMORY L.J. 1231, 1258 (2005) (“Since the adoption of the earliest comprehensive zoning laws
almost a century ago, use of property for purposes of the ‘single-family residence’ has been one of
the most revered and protected activities.”).
3. See 2 BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 1, § 23:2 (“Use of the police power to protect the
happiness, comfort, and general well-being of residents in single-family neighborhoods generally has
been held to be an important and legitimate public purpose for either excluding or regulating land
uses deemed incompatible with the family character of such areas.”); see also Christopher Serkin,
Divergence in Land Use Regulations and Property Rights, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (2019)
(labeling this “zoning’s original sin”).
4. See Eric R. Claeys, Property, Concepts, and Functions, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1, 10–12 (2019)
(summarizing the exclusionary theory of property); Andrea J. Boyack, Limiting the Collective Right
to Exclude, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 451, 456–58 (2017) (highlighting the central place of the right to
exclude in property and collecting sources).
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neighborhood. Put differently, when you buy (or rent) property in a good
neighborhood, you are getting more than just four walls and a roof.5 You
are also buying access to quality schools, parks, strong city services,
security, and even social opportunity.6 But these benefits of living in
wealthy areas are not free—society pays for them through economic and
racial exclusion and inequality between communities.7
Zoning, “a pillar of residential racial segregation,”8 creates imaginary
lines on the map, carving out separate zones that permit neighboring
communities to have dramatically different tax rates, social services, and
characteristics.9 In this way, local zoning contributes to divisions along
class and racial lines—divisions that are too often accepted as permanent
features of our society.10 Wealthy white suburbs and gentrified sections of
downtown too often exist alongside poor African-American or Latino
neighborhoods that are much less privileged.11 Zoning’s imaginary lines
isolate these marginalized communities from neighboring wealthy

5. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property Beyond Exclusion, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 521 (2019)
(emphasizing the complementarities of property ownership); Lee Anne Fennell, Co-Location, CoLocation, Co-Location: Land Use and Housing Priorities Reimagined, 39 VT. L. REV. 925 (2015)
(arguing that a home’s value is determined primarily by its location relative to other land uses and
land users).
6. See LaToya Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, 105 VA. L. REV. 397, 415 (2019) (observing
that “parents who move into these [wealthy] districts and purchase homes see themselves as
‘purchasing’ their child’s education”).
7. In the education context, exclusion takes the form of residency enforcement and criminal
punishment for enrolling children outside of their assigned school. Id. at 416–20. More generally,
exclusionary zoning allows “the upper-middle class to protect its position and pass its status on to its
children.” Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L.
87, 126 (2017).
8. Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Integration: Mixed-Income Housing as Discrimination
Management, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1140, 1166 (2019).
9. See infra Part I.
10. See Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning
in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 741 (1993) (“Minority communities,
which were often established as separate communities as the result of discriminatory zoning and
planning devices, are then frequently deprived of the land use protection basic to Euclidean zoning
principles.”); see also Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924)
(recognizing that the comprehensive zoning ordinance would discriminate based on class: “The plain
truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is to place all the property in an undeveloped
area of 16 square miles in a straight-jacket. . . . [T]he result to be accomplished is to classify the
population and segregate them according to their income or situation in life”), overruled by Vill. of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926).
11. This was and is by design:
The ability to live in white, well-resourced neighborhoods was not an option for racial and ethnic
minorities prior to the Fair Housing Act of 1968. . . . Fifty years after the passage of the Fair
Housing Act, America remains nearly as segregated by race as it was in 1968.
Jeannine Bell, The Hidden Fences Shaping Resegregation, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 813, 814
(2019).
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neighborhoods, despite both being part of the same metropolitan areas.12
Deference to local authority has an intuitive appeal when it comes to
zoning and planning.13 After all, such deference fits the idea that decisions
are best made at the local level.14 Sadly, over the past century, the intuitive
attractiveness of local control has provided cover for local governments
to use zoning to exclude communities of color and the poor.15 Although
President Trump was rightly called out for his racist dog-whistling when
he sent the following tweet—“I am happy to inform all of the people living
their Suburban Lifestyle Dream that you will no longer be bothered or
financially hurt by having low-income housing built in your
neighborhood”—traditional zoning as it is practiced in many communities
is already all about protection of the “suburban lifestyle dream” and the
racial and economic separation that such a dream involves.16
Trump’s tweet illustrates that zoning must be reclaimed from insular
local governments. Just as zoning arose and has evolved over the last
century, the law must continue to evolve in its understanding by
recognizing the interdependence of neighborhoods within the same

12. See infra section I.E.
13. See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation,
and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 238–40 (2008) (giving an overview of the autonomy-based
argument for local zoning).
14. See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2000) (providing
a summary of arguments for local governance).
15. It remains the case to this day that deference to local sovereignty enables “colorblind end-runs
around anti-segregation programs” and laws. David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as
Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 5, 52 (2017). The Washington Post, tackling just one form of
such exclusion, notes:
Across the country, American communities employ ‘snob zoning’ policies that forbid builders
from constructing apartment buildings or impose minimum residential lot requirements. They
are often presented as driven by concerns that building smaller units could change the character
of a community. . . . Such rules effectively impose a price floor for the cost of housing, making
it impossible for people who live below a certain means to afford them.
Elizabeth Winkler, ‘Snob Zoning’ Is Racial Housing Segregation by Another Name, WASH. POST
(Sept. 25, 2017, 6:48 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/25/snob-zoni
ng-is-racial-housing-segregation-by-another-name/ [https://perma.cc/578H-DCLF]; see also Sarah J.
Adams-Schoen, Dismantling Segregationist Land Use Controls, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. (Thomson
Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), Sept. 2020, at 1 (“Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the
racist scaffolding used to maintain racially segregated neighborhoods was, for the most part, overt.”).
16. As Matthew Yglesias observed, “realistically . . . Trump isn’t creating segregation. He’s simply
saying that he will let America’s local governments maintain the land use regimes they have . . . .”
Matthew Yglesias, Trump’s Tweets About Saving the “Suburban Lifestyle Dream,” Explained, VOX
(Aug. 3, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/8/3/21347565/suburban-lifestyle-dreamtrump-tweets-fair-housing (last visited Aug. 22, 2021); see also Tessa Stuart, Trump Is Happy to
Inform Suburban Voters that He Is Still a Racist, ROLLING STONE (July 29, 2020, 5:27 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-suburban-voters-suburban-fair-housingact-1032625/ [https://perma.cc/3YTN-QLK6] (quoting the tweet from Donald Trump and observing
that it is racist).
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region. Moving from local deference to state-level rules that constrain
local zoning could offer a way to lessen our country’s seemingly
intractable economic and racial inequality. As the title of a 2019 report
published by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University
declares, “Eliminating Exclusionary Land Use Regulations Should Be the
Civil Rights Issue of Our Time.”17
Before defining proposed changes, it is worth highlighting the cost of
maintaining the status quo. A recurring finding of social science research
is that place matters. In the 1980s, William Julius Wilson argued
persuasively that children who grow up in areas of concentrated poverty
do not have the same opportunities as children from wealthier areas.18
Similarly, Raj Chetty’s team of researchers recently showed that
economic mobility varies dramatically between neighborhoods.19 These
studies highlight something that is intuitively known by renters and
prospective homeowners alike: some locations offer a better life than
others20 Artificial boundaries, especially government-sanctioned ones,
lead to dramatically divergent outcomes at the city and even block level.21
The trend over zoning’s first century, assisted by transportation
advancements that opened up the suburbs to development, has been

17. Michael A. Stegman, Eliminating Exclusionary Land Use Regulations Should Be the Civil
Rights Issue of Our Time (Aug. 19, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Joint Center for
Housing Studies of Harvard University), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research-areas/workingpapers/eliminating-exclusionary-land-use-regulations-should-be-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/TDH5
-PAE2].
18. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 117 (1st ed. 1987).
19. For an interactive method of exploring local advantage and disadvantage, see The Opportunity
Atlas, OPPORTUNITY ATLAS, http://opportunityatlas.org [https://perma.cc/N52R-DRJ8], for a
continually updated collection of Raj Chetty’s work, see Raj Chetty’s personal website, RAJ CHETTY,
http://www.rajchetty.com/ [https://perma.cc/2M2V-5YW8]. See also Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren,
Patrick Kline & Emmanuel Saez, Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of
Intergenerational Mobility in the United States 42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 19843, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19843.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSC2-28JS]
(“Intergenerational mobility is a local problem, one that could potentially be tackled using placebased polices.”).
20. See WILSON, supra note 18 at 57 (describing how neighborhood effects can adversely affect
children in poor areas); Chetty et al., supra note 19, at 3 (“Location matters more for children growing
up in low income families . . . .”).
21. See, e.g., Raj Chetty, John Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Rogers & Sonya R. Porter,
The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social Mobility (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 25147, 2018), https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/the-opportunity-atlas/
[https://perma.cc/3C54-BHJK] (highlighting the significance of geographic location even within the
same neighborhood); see also Ezra Rosser, Shelter, Mobility, and the Voucher Program, BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. J. (forthcoming 2021) (summarizing recent economic mobility and location
studies).
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towards a greater concentration of locally-defined geographic privilege.22
Deference to local zoning governance undermines even the hardestfought progressive victories, as is shown in the Mt. Laurel “success” story.
A wealthy, white suburb of Camden and Philadelphia, Mt. Laurel, New
Jersey used restrictive zoning to block construction of affordable housing
within its boundaries.23 The NAACP, representing low-income AfricanAmerican and Latino populations, challenged the town’s exclusionary
practices—incredibly, they won.24 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a
pair of decisions, held that localities could not use zoning to foreclose
low-income housing25 and that cities had an affirmative obligation to
provide affordable housing.26 In an associated case, builders won a right
to bypass zoning limitations if their proposed development included
sufficient affordable housing.27 These outcomes show that progressive
impact litigation cases can have transformative potential. But even these
successes are limited by localism, which made it possible for local
opposition to blunt the impact of these transformative decisions.28 After

22. For the canonical accounts of the rise of suburbs that emphasize transportation advancements,
see SAM BASS WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON, 1870–
1900 (2d ed. 1978); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1985).
23. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 718, 720
(N.J. 1975) (“The general ordinance requirements, while not as restrictive as those in many similar
municipalities, nonetheless realistically allow only homes within the financial reach of persons of at
least middle income.”).
24. Id. at 723 (citing S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 290 A.2d 465, 473
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975)) (“The record thoroughly substantiates the findings of the trial court
that over the years Mount Laurel ‘has acted affirmatively to control development and to attract a
selective type of growth’ and that ‘though its zoning ordinances has exhibited economic
discrimination in that the poor have been deprived of adequate housing and the opportunity to secure
the construction of subsidized housing, and has used federal, state, county and local finances and
resources solely for the betterment of middle and upper-income persons.’”).
25. Id. at 731–32. (“As a developing municipality, Mount Laurel must, by its land use regulations,
make realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all
categories of people who may desire to live there, of course including those of low and moderate
income.”).
26. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 452 (N.J.
1983) (“We hold that where a developer succeeds in Mount Laurel litigation and proposes a project
providing a substantial amount of lower income housing, a builder’s remedy should be granted unless
the municipality establishes that because of environmental or other substantial planning concerns, the
plaintiff’s proposed project is clearly contrary to sound land use planning.”).
27. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192 (N.J. 1977). For more on
builder’s remedies, see Eric E. Stern, A Federal Builder’s Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 129 YALE
L.J. 1516 (2020).
28. Paul Boudreaux, Infill: New Housing for Twenty-First Century America, 45 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 595, 631 (2018).
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Mt. Laurel I,29 it still took twenty-five years for the first phase of the Ethel
Lawrence housing complex to be built, tucked into a non-descript plot of
land, nestled behind a wooded patch in the township.30 Despite the
litigation, localities continue to resist the idea that communities should do
more than just serve the wealthy.
Deference to local governance is so strong that we ignore the fact that
localities are not sovereign. Questioning the primacy of local government
zoning control creates space to challenge the laws that serve to perpetuate
property-tied inequality. Deference to local governments allows not-inmy-backyard (NIMBY-ism) sentiments to run roughshod over the
interests of poor communities. For example, decisions about the
placement of homeless shelters or waste treatment centers typically
burden communities already struggling under the weight of social
stressors and disinvestment.31 At the other end of the spectrum, privileged
communities use local deference as a tool for further isolation.32 Gated
communities are a fine example and cannot be dismissed as inapplicable
to questions of zoning simply because they also rely on private
agreements.33 While the walls that isolate wealthy communities from
struggling ones are often imperceptible, they are undoubtedly constructed
by local government zoning.
Previous efforts to break down these walls provide valuable lessons. In
1954, the Supreme Court declared “separate but equal” unconstitutional
in Brown v. Board of Education,34 but efforts to desegregate schools
through busing and funding equalization programs were met with fierce
resistance in the South and the North.35 After a brief attempt at
29. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 718, 720
(N.J. 1975).
30. Ezra Rosser’s observation of site, in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ (Sept. 15, 2012); see also Ethel
R. Lawrence Homes & Robinson Estates, FAIR SHARE HOUS. DEV., https://fairsharedevelopment.or
g/housing/development/ethel-lawrence [https://perma.cc/TVV9-FFU3]. For an academic exploration
and celebration of the Ethel Lawrence Homes project, see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, LEN ALBRIGHT,
REBECCA CASCIANO, ELIZABETH DERICKSON & DAVID N. KINSEY, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE
STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB (2013).
31. For the canonical article on this topic, see Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It?
Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001
(1993).
32. See Briffault, supra note 14, at 27 (“Localism in practice is often less about efficiency,
democracy, or community than about preserving existing political control over local resources,
protecting residents of high-wealth localities from the needs of their lower-wealth neighbors, and
providing opportunities for businesses to take advantage of interlocal competition for tax base.”).
33. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994) (discussing the rise of gated communities and the public
decisions that support such private enclaves).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. Id. at 488.
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equalization, we allowed schools to partially resegregate, both within and
across school districts.36 Resegregation is excused because public
education is funded primarily by local property taxes.37 We pretend that
the corresponding educational inequality is acceptable because the
Supreme Court said it is,38 even when the results of such economic
inequality closely approximate those of explicit racial barriers.39 We shrug
when cities resist attempts to develop affordable housing. Though there is
unquestionably the need for more affordable housing in places like Seattle
and Washington, D.C., proposals to provide it are met with vocal
opposition by current residents.40 Under the linked banners of preserving
a way of life and of protecting the city’s unique character, NIMBY-ism
thrives.41 Those not fortunate enough to live in such favored communities
must commute long distances to work or are kept out entirely.42 These
examples show that novel thinking about who controls zoning is required
if we are to reduce the extent to which property rules contribute to
structural inequality.
State-level limitations on local exclusionary zoning offer a concrete
way of attacking entrenched inequality. We are living through the New
Gilded Age, an era of rising inequality that is undermining the middle
class and trapping too many families in poverty while a select few amass

36. For discussion of resistance to desegregation and the ways aggressive localism is used to
maintain racial separation in education, see Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2016).
37. See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1210 (2018)
(noting that the local funding of public education “generally favors suburban jurisdictions over urban
ones”).
38. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (leaving in place a system
of inequitable educational funding).
39. As LaToya Baldwin Clark writes about post-Brown litigation, “the Court defeated
desegregation efforts on two fronts: first, by allowing local communities to geographically restrict
attendance in local schools; and second, by allowing those same communities to sequester educational
money locally.” Clark, supra note 6, at 399.
40. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air:
Transferable Development Rights and “Constituency Effects” in Land Use Law, 12 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 79, 105 (2020) (“Many American cities—particularly high-demand places like New York,
San Francisco, and Washington—restrict development in ways that drive up rents and spur housing
shortages. Our richest big cities today are run more by NIMBY coalitions of neighborhood groups
than by growth machine coalitions.”).
41. See Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 467, 492
(2018) (“Neighbors frequently fight against projects that would increase density, affect parking
availability, or change neighborhood aesthetics and culture. Their goal is to prevent or at least slow
neighborhood development, and, overall, these efforts are successful.”).
42. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban
Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2008) (discussing the problems in the urban fringe, beyond the outer
edge of metropolitan regions).
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enormous fortunes.43 The post-World War II period was marked by
widely shared income gains across the socio-economic spectrum.44 But
since the oil crises of the 1970s, the median income of those without a
college degree has stagnated, even though the larger economic pie has
continued to grow.45 Property plays an important role, allowing the uppermiddle class and the rich to consolidate their gains and pass along
tremendous lifelong advantages to their children.46 Among the unearned
advantages inherited by wealthy children, the characteristics and
amenities of the neighborhood where they grow up are among the most
significant.47 Reclaiming elements of planning and zoning from local
government, exercising the Euclid proviso, offers a realistic way of
altering the current system of location-specific advantages that exclude all
but the privileged.
The Euclid proviso serves as an important limitation on local zoning
even though it remains a largely dormant concept.48 In 1926, the Supreme
Court signed off on local zoning but noted “the possibility of cases where
the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the
municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the
way.”49 The main rule, that localities have the power to zone, has gotten
considerably more attention than the proviso’s limitation. But its
dormancy does not mean that it cannot be triggered: general public
interest supports limiting the authority of localities to make insular
43. It was, arguably, an academic book, Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, that
did the most to focus the public’s attention on the problem of inequality. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
44. JOHN SCHMITT, ELISE GOULD & JOSH BIVENS, AMERICA’S SLOW-MOTION WAGE CRISIS:
FOUR DECADES OF SLOW AND UNEQUAL GROWTH (2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/153535.pdf
[perma.cc/79C6-46SC].
45. ELISE GOULD, STATE OF WORKING AMERICA: WAGES 2018 (2019), https://www.epi.org/publ
ication/state-of-american-wages-2018/ [https://perma.cc/F4TU-AJ45].
46. RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IS
LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
107–08 (2017) (“[T]hose of us with high earnings are able to convert our income into wealth through
the housing market, with assistance from the tax code. We then become highly defensive—almost
paranoid—about the value of our property and turn to local policies, especially exclusionary zoning
ordinances, to fend off any encroachment by lower-income citizens and even the slightest risk to the
desirability of our neighborhoods.”).
47. See generally Jonathan T. Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, Geographic Effects on
Intergenerational Income Mobility, 91 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 83 (2015) (exploring the effect on lifetime
earnings of being raised in a wealthy neighborhood).
48. Though sometimes referred to as the Euclidian caveat, this Article refers to the Supreme Court’s
limitation on deference to local zoning as the Euclid proviso, drawing upon the more familiar Lockean
proviso. Since most writing about zoning simply uses Euclid for the proposition that zoning is
constitutional, the hope is that by naming and focusing on the Euclid proviso, more attention will be
paid to this built-in limitation.
49. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
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decisions that drive up the price of housing in an effort to exclude
outsiders.
Local governance dominates areas where the interests of private
property owners are most pronounced. Though most people think of
property as the relationship a person has with a thing—my computer, our
car, their bicycle—property is really about the relationship owners have
with everyone else.50 Simply stated, property rights allow people to form
expectations in their dealings with others.51 If, for example, I purchase a
particular seat at a baseball game, it is reasonable for me to expect that
someone sitting in my seat will quickly make way for me upon my arrival
and that employees of the stadium will defend my right to the seat. Other
purchases come with different expectations. For example, most people
have a long list of expectations about their entitlements as homeowners,
including reliable electricity, mail service, and even public funding of
road maintenance. The larger point, which carries across these examples,
is that property rights are best understood not as rights over objects but as
the right to certain expectations when interacting with others. Many of the
most important expectations that people have is who will live in their
community, who will be their neighbors, and who will be excluded.
Regionalism insists that localities broaden their circle of concern to take
into account the larger region’s needs, including the needs of struggling
communities. By so doing, regionalism threatens the settled
expectations—the property rights—of property owners. By insisting that
localities broaden their circle of concern to take into account the larger
region’s needs, including the needs of struggling communities,
regionalism threatens the settled expectations—the property rights—of
property owners.
The zoning challenge of the next century is how to reorient property
owners’ expectations so that there is more space for inclusive planning.
This Article explores how triggering the Euclid proviso could lessen the
extent to which jurisdictionally bound property rights contribute to forms
of inequality. Demographic changes have created a unique moment in
which it is possible to imagine meaningful change to how we govern
property and to the relationship between privileged and peripheral areas.
For generations, urban growth has been outward facing. The rise of
suburbs—propelled by white flight, public infrastructure investment, and
50. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). But see Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012) (accepting the property as relationships framing as a descriptive matter
but arguing that fails to account for the in rem nature of property rights and is therefore not a good
theory of property).
51. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
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rigid, enforced legal boundaries—is but an extreme example.52 The
outward movement of jobs and capital transformed metropolitan areas,
creating rings of opportunity in the white suburbs.53 Cities became
populated primarily by African Americans and Latinos and were marked
by the negative consequences of concentrated poverty.54 Outsiders looked
inward with fear at the hopelessness and violence that was partly a result
of decades of “disinvestment in inner-city neighborhoods.”55 But in many
metropolitan areas, those fears, as well as the language previously used to
discuss urban space, now seem dated.
In some cities, the problem today is not underinvestment in downtown
but gentrification.56 Young professionals who grew up in the suburbs have
rediscovered the advantages of city living. They are putting down roots
and demanding that local government provide a rich array of amenities
and services. If local governance is not challenged now, suburbs could
soon find themselves suffering the sort of downward spiral that central
cities went through from the 1960s to the 1990s.57 At the same time, many
cities are quickly becoming areas reserved exclusively for the rich. The
staggering rise in the price of housing in New York City, Boston, San
Francisco, and Washington, D.C. has forced some workers farther and
farther out.58 If privilege simply relocates from the suburbs to the city,
reproducing the same dynamics of place-based inequality in new
locations, we will have squandered the opportunity offered by this
52. White flight refers to the mass exodus of Whites following desegregation and in migration of
African-Americans to central cities, select neighborhoods, and formerly racially segregated public
schools. For more on the politics of white flight, see KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CONSERVATISM (2005).
53. See WARNER, supra note 22, at 266–69 (describing the movement of jobs from central cities to
deconcentrated suburbs).
54. For the seminal work on concentrated poverty, see WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK
DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
55. Doug Smith, Community Economic Development, Regionalism, and Regional Equity:
Emerging Strategies and Changing Roles for CED Attorneys, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY.
DEV. L. 315, 317 (2012).
56. Gentrification in this Article, and in legal scholarship in general, arguably is overemphasized.
As Lee Fennell observes, “[d]espite receiving the lion’s share of attention, gentrification appears to
be empirically overshadowed by stasis and decline, at least in cities like Chicago and Philadelphia.”
Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349, 370 (2017).
57. The suburbs have not completely lost their appeal either, especially for dual income families
with children. Currently, we are experiencing a moment in which the wealthy can imagine living in
both the suburbs and the central city. See Schragger, supra note 37, at 1206 (acknowledging the
“renewed popularity of the central cities” while also observing that “most development in the United
States is still occurring outside the urban centers, in the suburban fringe.”).
58. See JENNY SCHUETZ, COST, CROWDING, OR COMMUTING? HOUSING STRESS ON THE MIDDLE
CLASS (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/cost-crowding-or-commuting-housing-stress-onthe-middle-class/ [https://perma.cc/F9LQ-SBHH] (noting that commutes are longer in expensive
housing markets).
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inflection point to break down the walls that separate communities within
the same region.
The challenge is to find feasible interventions that can make a
meaningful difference. Embracing regionalism in planning and zoning is
one such intervention. Zoning and planning must become areas of
political struggle; that they are not is a failure of progressive imagination
to date. The zoning powers local governments exercise are statedelegated, which means that states have the authority to move to a regional
or state-level model if the general public calls for it or if elected leaders
are courageous. By reclaiming zoning, states can reduce inequality and
extend the benefits of property to more communities. Selective state-level
decision-making in zoning that favors inclusive growth would also help
alleviate the spatial inequality and division that naturally flows from
pairing zoning authority with small municipal boundaries. Municipal
boundaries are arbitrary but take on added significance when states
delegate to them the power to exclude, or in other words, the power to
zone.
Short-term thinking defines any ambitious project as unobtainable or
politically dead upon arrival. Accordingly, scholars, are quick to dismiss
calls for aggressive state assertions of zoning authority as unrealistic
utopian dreams.59 Serious scholarship, so the thinking goes, accepts local
insular governance and the NIMBY-ism of homeowners as
insurmountable obstacles and focuses not on major change but on
medium- to small-scale interventions.60 This is not to dismiss such work:
incremental change is important and, as this Article highlights, barriers to
regional zoning are significant. But as we approach the century-mark on
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,61 it is also worth taking a broad
view on what needs to change for zoning to become more inclusive.
Operationalizing the proviso is not a panacea to the problems of
59. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002)
(criticizing state intervention).
60. As Tim Iglesias notes, “for many reasons—including traditional policy reasons, local
governments’ vested interests, and citizens’ lack of a regional vision—most states for the foreseeable
future will continue to delegate substantial land use authority to local governments.” Tim Iglesias,
Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing Regulation While Localism
Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 457 (2003); see also Alejandro E. Camacho & Nicholas J. Marantz,
Beyond Preemption, Toward Metropolitan Governance, 39 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 125, 147 (2020)
(arguing for an alternative to state preemption in part because “the political challenges associated with
complete preemption of the field of land-use regulation by a state or regional entity are widely
recognized”).
61. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING
ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (1924); see also Michael
Allan Wolf, A Common Law of Zoning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 771, 785–88 (2019) (providing a history of
the creation and spread of the standard state enabling act).
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inequality, but it could make a dent. The challenges associated with
structural inequality call for a reexamination of traditional deference to
local zoning. It is time to embrace a wider circle of concern and to be more
ambitious about what zoning can accomplish. State intervention in zoning
to check local governments provides a concrete way to explore what it
would look like for property law to take race and class divisions seriously
and to challenge the privileges tied to locally defined property rights.
This Article explores exclusionary zoning’s impact on housing supply
and the related need for state intervention zoning. While deference to local
zoning causes numerous problems that states can mitigate, local zoning’s
exclusionary tendency is the most harmful. The Article, accordingly, uses
housing as the primary lens through which to explore the direction zoning
should change. Part I presents the emerging consensus that something
needs to be done to reduce the extent to which exclusionary zoning
constrains the supply of new housing. Progressives concerned about
affordable housing have finally joined conservatives, who have long
voiced concern about supply constraints, in pushing to check overregulation of new housing construction. For too long, progressives
focused on what proved to be smaller battles in the affordable housing
wars and ended up glossing over the larger relationship between zoning
regulations and housing supply. When it comes to exclusionary zoning,
there is cause for optimism when even rival scholarly camps—progressive
and conservative scholars—come together to push against the status quo.
Part II looks back at the first century of zoning and emphasizes the
possibilities offered by the Euclid proviso. It highlights both the harms of
local exclusionary zoning and the doctrinal levers that provide limited
checks on unfettered local exclusionary practices. Even as the Supreme
Court affirmed that cities have the power to zone in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,62 the Court also indicated that such state-delegated
authority could be limited if it was exercised in a way that did not comport
with the general welfare. As Part II shows, ever since Euclid, public
interest lawyers have attempted to fight back against exclusionary
practices through assertions that local interests in keeping people out must
give way to the state interest in permitting additional affordable housing.
The Euclid proviso serves as a limitation on the power to zone and
provides a justification for involving state authority in response to local
parochialism.
Part III presents and responds to scholarly defenses of the zoning status
quo. Deference to local zoning, especially in light of the ongoing
prioritization of single-family home (SFH) zones, provides property
62. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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owners with considerable stability. And there is value in stability. State
mandates could weaken the ability of progressive cities and municipalities
to take care of the most vulnerable. Part III seriously examines the
stability and slippery slope arguments but ultimately finds such arguments
too tethered to and limited by existing inequalities to be convincing. It
then considers perhaps the most powerful argument against increasing the
housing supply through deregulation: that such moves will lead to
gentrification. Here, too, the Article ultimately comes down on the side of
increasing affordable housing through upzoning, based on studies that
question the link between new construction and resident displacement.
Part IV looks forward and argues that zoning’s second century should
be marked by more assertive use of state-preemption of local zoning.
Though past legal responses to local exclusionary zoning have been only
marginally successful, this Part argues that there are reasons to be
cautiously optimistic. Societal changes—the increasing attractiveness of
the urban core to well-heeled younger adults and bipartisan awareness that
too many people find themselves priced out of decent housing—have
weakened local zoning’s stranglehold on politics and development. While
one can imagine negative consequences should deference to local zoning
be undermined, there is no doubt that traditional zoning operates to
exclude low-income people, especially people of color, from better off
localities. Displacing existing local zoning barriers with regulations that
take a more permissive approach to increasing the housing supply
appropriately threatens entrenched interests by declaring that cities should
welcome everyone, not just the elite.
I.

ZONING AND HOUSING SUPPLY

Signs that many parts of the country are at a breaking point in terms of
housing supply are all around: record high prices for homes despite the
coronavirus pandemic, workers forced to commute several hours just to
get to work, and housing costs that leave even middle-class families
struggling to pay ordinary non-housing expenses. Part I explores the
limited supply of housing and the ways in which cities have used zoning
to block new construction. Tackling the relationship between supply and
high housing costs is neither a progressive nor a conservative issue but
something that invites bipartisan cooperation. Reduction of housing
supply constraints is particularly pressing in light of the renewed
desirability of central cities. As Part I shows, cities have joined exclusive
suburbs in making construction prohibitively expensive, locking in place
large lot development and limiting housing density. Though increasing
supply is viewed skeptically by some communities and advocates, supply
matters. Fortunately, space is emerging for those on the left and the right

Rosser (Do Not Delete)

2021]

10/19/21 1:43 PM

THE EUCLID PROVISO

825

to recognize the shared responsibility of pushing for zoning change.
A.

Bipartisan Agreement

In the closing months of the Obama administration, the White House
released a remarkable report, The Housing Development Toolkit.63 The
report took aim at “local barriers to housing development,” which the
report claimed have “reduced the ability of many housing markets to
respond to growing demand . . . jeopardizing housing affordability for
working families, increasing income inequality by reducing less-skilled
workers’ access to high-wage labor markets, and stifling GDP growth by
driving labor migration away from the most productive regions.”64 The
Toolkit’s first section highlighted the rise in local zoning restrictions since
1970 and argued that cumulatively these restrictions have made it difficult
and prohibitively expensive to build new housing in areas with strong
labor markets.65 But what makes the report remarkable are its ten
recommended “starting points for local efforts to modernize housing
planning and development”:
(1) Establish by-right development
(2) Tax vacant land or donate it to non-profit developers
(3) Streamline or shorten permitting processes and timelines
(4) Eliminate off-street parking requirements
(5) Enact high-density and multifamily zoning
(6) Allow accessory dwelling units
(7) Establish density bonuses
(8) Employ inclusionary zoning
(9) Establish development tax or value capture incentives
(10) Use property tax abatements66
The pro-development, anti-regulatory bent of the Housing
Development Toolkit makes it read like a Republican white paper, not like
something produced by the Obama White House.67
The Housing Development Toolkit did not emerge out of thin air. Ten
months earlier, Jason Furman, chairman of the White House Council of
Economic Advisors at the time, gave a speech at the Urban Institute
attacking “excessive or unnecessary land use or zoning regulations,”
63. THE WHITE HOUSE, HOUSING DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.arch
ives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_Toolkit%20f.2.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/Q6ZK-HE8N].
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 5–8.
66. Id. at 14–19.
67. For extended discussion of the Toolkit’s recommendations, see Michael Lewyn, The Obama
Administration’s Parting Shot, 45 REAL EST. L.J. 598 (2017).
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which he argued “allow a small number of individuals to capture the
economic benefits of living in a community, thus limiting diversity and
mobility.”68 Furman followed those remarks up with an op-ed, published
by the San Francisco Chronicle the same day as the Housing
Development Toolkit was released, in which he emphasized that
regulations have led to supply constraints and that “more efficient policies
can promote availability and affordability of housing.”69 To a remarkable
extent, with the exception advocating for inclusionary zoning, Furman’s
arguments and the Toolkit’s recommendations largely reflect conservative
talking points.70 This was not lost on others. George Mason law professor
Ilya Somin noted in a Washington Post op-ed following Furman’s speech
that there was an “emerging consensus” among “economists and other
public policy experts across the political spectrum . . . that zoning rules
are a major obstacle to affordable housing and economic opportunity for
the poor and lower middle class.”71 Somin observed, “Libertarians and
other free market advocates have criticized zoning on such grounds for
decades,” then noted, “recently, however, the critique of zoning has been
taken up by prominent left of center commentators.”72
The left-of-center critique is noteworthy because it comes with the risk
of alienating environmentalists as well as urban progressives who
stridently resist increased development in their communities.73 NIMBYism enjoys strong support from many of the same urban communities that
voted overwhelming in favor of Obama in both 2008 and 2012. After the
Toolkit was published, Doug Trumm, publications director for The
Urbanist, declared, “Obama Is A YIMBY,” (Yes In My Backyard) and
concluded, “we as housing advocates welcome the rhetorical shift

68. Jason Furman, Chairman, White House Council of Econ. Advisors, Remarks at the Urban
Institute, Barriers to Shared Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents 1–2
(Nov. 20, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151120_barri
ers_shared_growth_land_use_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9QP-XT2Z].
69. Jason Furman, Reform Land Use, Promote Shared Growth of New Housing, S.F. CHRON. (Sept.
25, 2016, 8:34 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Reform-land-use-prom
ote-shared-growth-of-new-9283703.php [https://perma.cc/DGM5-6RZR].
70. See, e.g., Vanessa Brown Calder, Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordability,
CATO INST.: POL’Y ANALYSIS (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa823.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ96-9VE7] (making a connection between an increase in land use
restrictions and the housing affordability problem).
71. Ilya Somin, The Emerging Cross-Ideological Consensus on Zoning, WASH. POST (Dec. 5,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/05/the-emerging-cro
ss-ideological-consensus-on-zoning/ [https://perma.cc/5ADS-W75U].
72. Id.
73. Lorraine Woellert, Obama Takes on Zoning Laws in Bid to Build More Housing, Spur Growth,
POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2016, 5:13 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-takes-on-zoni
ng-laws-in-bid-to-build-more-housing-spur-growth-228650 [https://perma.cc/LS7U-JZY8].
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emphasizing the need for cities to pick up the pace of multifamily housing
production and focus policy on affordability and equity rather than
obstruction and ever-lengthening process. It helps to have friends in high
places. So thanks, Obama.”74 Also drawing on the “Thanks, Obama”
meme,75 the Urbanism Editor for Curbed, Alissa Walker, similarly
celebrated the Toolkit, writing, “this is a very progressive document that
is sure to inspire some changes and enrage NIMBYs everywhere. I think
I speak for everyone priced out of big cities when I say thanks, Obama.”76
The problem in many big cities, as Cecilia Muñoz, Assistant to the
President and Director of the Domestic Policy Council, and Luke Tate,
Special Assistant to the President for Economic Mobility, note is that “too
many of the communities with the most dynamic growth have pulled up
those ladders [of opportunity] behind them—often unintentionally—by
creating conditions that make it impossible for families to find affordable
housing in the same communities where they can find jobs.”77 That a
report essentially calling for deregulation of urban space could be
characterized as “very progressive” is a sign of both how intertwined
zoning and NIMBY-ism are across much of the country and how far the
left has shifted when it comes to housing supply considerations.
The progressive turn against zoning is significant enough that a recent
article decided it merited its own label: “the elite liberaltarian consensus
on zoning deregulation.”78 As this label—and the shortened version, “elite
liberaltarian consensus”—coined by professors Ganesh Sitaraman,
Morgan Ricks, and Christopher Serkin suggests, the progressive turn
against zoning combines strains of liberalism and libertarianism.79 In their
article, Regulation and the Geography of Inequality, the authors argue that
“[i]t is quickly becoming conventional wisdom among elite policymakers
that the inaccessibility of superstar cities because of out-of-control

74. Doug Trumm, Obama Is a YIMBY, THE URBANIST (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.theurbanist.
org/2016/09/27/obama-is-a-yimby/ [https://perma.cc/7VLZ-GWCR].
75. See Hunter Schwarz, ‘Thanks Obama.’ The Evolution of a Meme that Defined a Presidency,
WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/02/13/thanksobama-the-evolution-of-a-meme-that-defined-a-presidency/ [https://perma.cc/4GNC-FE3K]
(providing an overview of the “Thanks Obama” meme).
76. Alissa Walker, Obama’s New Housing Toolkit Aims to Make Cities More Affordable, CURBED
(Sept. 28, 2016, 11:35 AM), https://www.curbed.com/2016/9/28/13080630/obama-affordable-housi
ng-zoning-nimbys [https://perma.cc/DN7A-EV4K].
77. Cecilia Muñoz & Luke Tate, When Communities Pull Up the Ladder of Opportunity, MEDIUM
(Sept. 26, 2016), https://medium.com/@Cecilia44/when-communities-pull-up-the-ladder-of-opportu
nity-69c692540360#.sxmju5gxj (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
78. Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan Ricks & Christopher Serkin, Regulation and the Geography of
Inequality, 70 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1810 (2021).
79. Id. at 1770, 1810.
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housing prices is a critical public policy challenge.”80 Serkin, one of the
nation’s leading land use scholars, and his co-authors acknowledge the
ways over-regulation can increase housing costs in select cities but argue
against what they see as the emerging “liberal orthodoxy, at least among
academics and elite policymakers, to promote density by removing zoning
restrictions.”81 Their position is that lessening zoning restrictions will not
do enough to tackle geographic inequality and could lead to greater
concentration of economic power in a few superstar cities, amounting to
a policy choice to abandon of the rest of the country.82
These are valid concerns and the policy changes that the article offers
up, reversing deregulation and laissez-faire approaches in transportation,
communications, trade, and antitrust areas, are valuable.83 What is unclear
is why the article adopts an either/or approach to the article’s suggested
changes and the dismissively labeled emerging “liberal orthodoxy?”84
Both things can be true: excessive zoning regulations are making housing
unaffordable in parts of the country with significant growth and more
should be done to ensure growth is not limited to a few superstar cities.
Given the infrequency of progressives and conservatives seeing eye-toeye on something as significant as zoning, it is worth explaining and
defending the “elite liberaltarian consensus on zoning deregulation.”85
B.

The High Cost of Housing

The emerging bipartisan sense that something needs to be done about
zoning is driven by the high cost of housing. It is common knowledge
(which is to say public perception and academic studies are in agreement)
that housing is unaffordable to wide segments of the population.86
Especially for the poor and lower middle class, housing is unaffordable

80. Id. at 1811.
81. Id. at 1814.
82. Id. at 1810–17.
83. Id. at 1785–1809.
84. Id. at 1814.
85. Id. at 1810.
86. See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, Jim Parrott & Mark Zandi, The Conundrum Affordable Housing
Poses for the Nation, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/theconundrum-affordable-housing-poses-for-the-nation/2020/01/01/a5b360da-1b5f-11ea-8d585ac3600967a1_story.html [https://perma.cc/C44L-Y9X3] (highlighting the problem of affordable
housing); Carey L. Biron, Unaffordable Rental Housing May Be ‘New Normal’ in the United States,
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2020, 10:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-housing-rents/unafford
able-rental-housing-may-be-new-normal-in-the-united-states-idUSKBN1ZU0IC [https://perma.cc/N
53W-8HGZ] (same).
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nationwide.87 Wealth and income obstacles put homeownership out of
reach for many young families.88 Moreover, according to calculations
based on HUD’s fair market rent figures and a 30% cap on housing costs
as a percentage of total household income, by the National Low-Income
Housing Coalition, the 2020 National Housing Wage is $23.96 per hour
for a modest two-bedroom rental home, meaning one would have to make
that amount per hour in a full-time job in order to afford such a home.89
Given that the federal minimum wage is only $7.25 per hour, many
tenants are not making enough to afford decent housing even with steady
employment.90 Even taking account state and municipal mandates that
raise the minimum wage above the federal floor,91 “the average minimum
wage worker must work nearly 97 hours per week (more than two fulltime jobs) to afford a two-bedroom rental home.”92 It is perhaps not
surprising that California has a housing affordability problem, with nine
of the ten most expensive metropolitan counties (Honolulu County is
number ten).93 But even in Iowa, it takes more than two full-time jobs at
minimum wage in order to afford a modest two-bedroom unit.94 As the
report notes, “[i]n no state, metropolitan area, or county in the U.S. can a
worker earning the federal or prevailing state or local minimum wage
afford a modest two-bedroom rental home at fair market rent by working
a standard 40-hour work week.”95
If rental costs are prohibitive for those at the bottom of the labor market,
homeownership is even more so. Not only can it be difficult to save for a
down payment on a low wage, but house prices seem to be moving ever
87. For a more extensive elaboration of the affordability crisis than is found in this Article, see
Andrea J. Boyack, Responsible Devolution of Affordable Housing, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183,
1189–1209 (2019).
88. A. Mechele Dickerson, Millenials, Affordable Housing, and the Future of Homeownership, 24
J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 435, 442–56 (2016).
89. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2020, at 2 (2020), https://reports.nlihc.org
/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_BOOK_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q43N-W56W].
90. See Jeff Andrews, Affordable Housing for Minimum Wage Workers Doesn’t Exist, CURBED
(June 18, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://archive.curbed.com/2019/6/18/18683501/affordable-housing-rentminimum-wage-out-of-reach-nlihc-2019 [https://perma.cc/7C92-3YQQ].
91. See State Minimum Wage Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (July 1, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/age
ncies/whd/minimum-wage/state [https://perma.cc/WF26-KBXV]; Inventory of U.S. City and County
Minimum Wage Ordinances, U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (July 2, 2021), http://laborcenter.berkeley.
edu/minimum-wage-living-wage-resources/inventory-of-us-city-and-county-minimum-wageordinances/ [https://perma.cc/4DQ4-ZH4V].
92. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., supra note 89, at 2.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id. at 19.
95. Id. at 4; see also Matthew Desmond & Monica Bell, Housing, Poverty, and the Law, 2015 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 15, 16 (2015) (noting “the majority of poor renting families in America devote
over half of their income to housing; almost a quarter dedicate more than 70%”).
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upward. The median sales price of a house in the United States at the end
of 2019 was $327,100 and the average price was $384,600.96 But buyers
looking for a two-bedroom home in the Washington, D.C. area will be
hard-pressed to find one at those price points. Although such observations
are quickly dated, consider the cost of housing in late July 2020. Options
included a $330,000 apartment in the Columbia Heights neighborhood
which squeezes in two bedrooms, living room and kitchen, and bath into
618 square feet.97 Additionally, the apartment included a $245 monthly
Homeowners Association (HOA) fee.98 The unit was listed as an
affordable housing unit, for which only households making between
roughly $78,000 and $130,000 are eligible to apply to purchase the unit.99
There were other options, of course, but notably only two units west of
Rock Creek Park (the park is a traditional dividing line in the city between
the expensive upper northwest and the less expensive eastern part of
Washington, D.C.) that cost less than $350,000.100 The most attractive, a
1350 square foot two-bedroom co-op apartment located near the National
Cathedral, was deceptively priced right at $350,000 but in the fine print
was the kicker, a $1,486 monthly HOA fee.101 Moving further out does
not help much. It is not until one looks to Southeast, D.C., below the
Anacostia River, that one could find duplex units and standalone singlefamily homes for less than $350,000.102 But even in an area long feared
by Washington, D.C.’s white residents,103 signs of market-spillovers from
the more privileged parts of the D.C. region (and of gentrification)
96. Median Sales Price of Houses Sold for the United States, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MSPUS [https://perma.cc/MKZ2-XRJN]; Average Sales Price of
Houses Sold for the United States, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
ASPUS [https://perma.cc/G66V-9ZLP].
97. 1225 Fairmont St NW #105, Washington, D.C. 20009, REDFIN (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.redfin.com/DC/Washington/1225-Fairmont-St-NW-20009/unit-105/home/55188161
(last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See generally Two-Bedroom Listings in Washington, D.C., REDFIN, https://redfin.com (last
visited Sept. 12, 2021) (search “Rock Creek Park;” then add filters: “max price: $350k” and “min
beds: 2”).
101. 4000 Cathedral Ave NW Unit 538B, Washington, D.C. 20016, REDFIN (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www.redfin.com/DC/Washington/4000-Cathedral-Ave-NW-20016/unit-538B/home/172029
468#property-details (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
102. See generally Two-Bedroom Listings in Southeast Washington, D.C., REDFIN,
https://redfin.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (search “Southeast Washington, D.C.;” then add filters:
“max price: $350k” and “min beds: 2”).
103. See Eddie Dean, A Brief History of White People in Southeast, WASH. CITY PAPER (Oct. 16,
1998), https://washingtoncitypaper.com/article/275849/a-brief-history-of-white-people-in-southeast/
[https://perma.cc/WPB8-WNME] (discussing “the fears and misperceptions of white people” related
to crime and race that surround the Anacostia neighborhood).
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abound, with renovated houses priced in the $450,000-$700,000 range.104
If Washington, D.C. is bad, San Francisco is even worse. During the
same time period, there was not a single two-bedroom unit in the city that
cost less than $350,000.105 Indeed, even after coronavirus hit the economy,
only three two-bedroom units were available in late July 2020 that cost
less than half a million dollars.106 The two market rate units, one priced at
$399,000 and the other at $449,499, both came with roughly $1000 a
month HOA fees.107 The below market rate dwelling unit, which came
with a cap on household income and could only be sold to first-time
homebuyers, cost $499,500 for 610 square feet in an area far removed
from downtown.108 Things were not much better in the rest of the Bay
Area. To find a comparable house for less than half a million south of San
Francisco, one had to drive all the way to Redwood City, where two were
available, one of which was a trailer home.109 Across the Bay Bridge, not
a single two-bedroom unit was available in Berkeley for less than half a
million and only three such units cost less than $350,000 in Oakland.110
The same basic observations about the price of housing can be made about
cities across the country, from Boston and New York to Denver and
Portland.111
104. See generally Listings in Washington, D.C., REDFIN, https://redfin.com (last visited Sept. 12,
2021) (search “Washington, D.C.”).
105. See generally Two-Bedroom Listings in San Francisco, CA, REDFIN, https://redfin.com (last
visited Sept. 12, 2021) (search “San Francisco, CA;” then add filters: “max price: $350k” and “min
beds: 2”).
106. See generally Two-Bedroom Listings in San Francisco, CA, REDFIN, https://redfin.com (last
visited Sept. 12, 2021) (search “San Francisco, CA;” then add filters: “max price: $500k” and “min
beds: 2”).
107. 1535 Buchanan St #5, San Francisco, CA 94115, REDFIN (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.redfin
.com/CA/San-Francisco/1535-Buchanan-St-94115/unit-5/home/12401127 (last visited Sept. 10,
2021) (significantly, the HOA fees for this property include “Water, Gas, Electricity, Heat, Garbage,
Ext Bldg Maintenance, Grounds Maintenance, [and] Homeowners Insurance.”); 501 Beale St Unit
11F, San Francisco, CA 94105, REDFIN (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.redfin.com/CA/SanFrancisco/501-Beale-St-94105/unit-11F/home/22854534 (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) (notably, the
list price for the unit was later lowered to $399,499).
108. 323 29th St Unit C101, San Francisco, CA 94131, REDFIN (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.red
fin.com/CA/San-Francisco/323-29th-St-94131/unit-C101/home/1615871 (last visited Sept. 10,
2021).
109. See generally Two-Bedroom Listings in Redwood City, CA, REDFIN, https://redfin.com (last
visited Sept. 12, 2021) (search “Redwood City, CA;” then add filters: “max price: $500k” and “min
beds: 2”).
110. See generally Two-Bedroom Listings in Berkeley, CA, REDFIN, https://redfin.com (last visited
Sept. 12, 2021) (search “Berkeley, CA;” then add filters: “max price: 500k” and “min beds: 2”); TwoBedroom Listings in Oakland, CA, REDFIN, https://redfin.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (search
“Oakland, CA;” then add filters: “max price: $350k” and “min beds: 2”).
111. See J.P. MORGAN, DOES THE U.S. RISK ANOTHER HOUSING MARKET FALL? (2020),

Rosser (Do Not Delete)

832
C.

10/19/21 1:43 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:811

Supply Constraints

The problem of housing affordability is a story not just about renter
income but also about supply. As The State of the Nation’s Housing 2019
reports, residential construction is not keeping up with demand growth
and “the housing that is being built is intended primarily for the higher
end of the market.”112 As the report notes, not only are we not seeing a
trickling down of units to the low end, but half of all metropolitans “posted
declines of more than 10 percent” in the supply of low-cost (below $800
per month) units over the 2011–2017 period.113 Supply constraints, low
inventory, and a construction industry still reeling from the Great
Recession are pushing up housing prices.114 As a Freddie Mac report noted
in December 2018, combining housing starts and housing depreciation
with demand factors such as household formation “reveals a large and
persistent shortfall in recent years.”115 Although downward filtering is the
primary mechanism through which housing reaches poor people, supply
shortfalls in a dynamic city can lead to reverse filtering, through which
existing housing moves from a less well off to a better off household.116
Indeed, with demand at the low end of the market substantially outpacing
supply, housing prices appreciated faster between 2000 and 2019 at the
lower end of the housing market (126.2% appreciation) than at the high
end (86.4% appreciation).117
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that the market will solve the
https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/research/us-housing-risk [https://perma.cc/MC2L-GRJL] (special
report from J.P. Morgan’s Economic Research Team, 2020) (providing an interactive map that
demonstrated that despite the expanding supply, areas such as Denver, Portland, and Boston are still
experiencing high prices).
112. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019,
at 2 (2019), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_
Housing_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEX8-A7C6].
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id. at 7–10; Asha Bharadwaj & Charles S. Gascon, Slowing U.S. Housing Sector Still Shaped
by Great Recession, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: REG’L ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www
.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/first-quarter-2019/slowing-us-housing-sector
[https://perma.cc/9C69-N4T8].
115. FREDDIE MAC, THE MAJOR CHALLENGE OF INADEQUATE U.S. HOUSING SUPPLY 3 (2018),
http://www.freddiemac.com/fmac-resources/research/pdf/201811-Insight-06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4KM-4N8K].
116. See Vincent J. Reina, Affordable Housing, but for How Long? The Opportunity and Challenge
of Mandating Permanently Affordable Housing, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267, 1272 (2019); C. Tsuriel
Somerville & Christopher J. Mayer, Government Regulation and Changes in the Affordable Housing
Stock, 9 ECON. POL'Y REV. 45, 50 (2003).
117. JUNG HYUN CHOI, JOHN WALSH & LAURIE GOODMAN, URB. INST., WHY THE MOST
AFFORDABLE HOMES INCREASED THE MOST IN PRICE BETWEEN 2000 AND 2019, at 1 (2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102216/why-the-most-affordable-homes-increa
sed-the-most-in-price_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD5R-BYTJ].
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housing supply problem; in other words, the observed imbalance is
temporary and will self-correct.118 When demand outpaces supply,
developers will get extraordinary profit. That will encourage existing
firms to expand and new entrants to enter the construction market. With
time, the housing market will stabilize. Housing prices will approximate
the cost of construction, taking into account ordinary profit margins, and
supply will expand to meet demand in cities undergoing economic
growth.119 It is still the case that the low end of the housing market will
need subsidies because the monthly financing and maintenance expense
of a modest unit is more than those at the bottom of the income spectrum
can cover,120 but, with time, downward filtering should fill some of that
gap.121 As Matthew Desmond’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book Evicted
shows, there is money to be made even at the low end of the market so
long as the costs incurred by landlords are kept low.122 Though the
Milwaukee rental market depicted in Evicted is different from the
experience of poor people in booming cities in the midst of reverse
filtering, the vast majority of poor people nationwide do not get public
housing support, residing instead in units provided solely by the private
market.123 Put differently, for people in all income brackets, not just those
118. See Edward Glaeser, Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/TM2D-Z7
VC] (“How do we know that high housing costs have anything to do with artificial restrictions on
supply? Perhaps the most compelling argument uses the tools of Economics 101. If demand alone
drove prices, then we should expect to see places that have high costs also have high levels of
construction.”).
119. John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 96–97 (2014);
see David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1692 (2013).
120. See ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 47 (3d ed. 2015); Miriam
Axel-Lute, Trickle Up Housing: Filtering Does Go Both Ways, SHELTERFORCE (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://shelterforce.org/2017/11/02/time-for-trickle-up-housing/ [https://perma.cc/2ZZJ-K2A4].
121. See Stuart S. Rosenthal, Are Private Markets and Filtering a Viable Source of Low-Income
Housing? Estimates from a “Repeat Income” Model, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 687, 704 (2014) (arguing
that downward filtering of rental units occurs faster than the rate for owner-occupied units and that
housing advocates should “take seriously the market’s ability to generate lower-income housing,
especially among rental units”).
122. See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016);
see also Ezra Rosser, Laying the Foundation: The Private Rental Market and Affordable Housing, 44
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 499, 504–16 (2017) (providing a summary of the book); EVA ROSEN, THE
VOUCHER PROMISE: “SECTION 8” AND THE FATE OF AN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOOD (2020)
(exploring the low end of the rental market and how tenants and landlords benefit from the voucher
program). For an exploration of whether the landlords in Evicted were exploiting their tenants, see
Ezra Rosser, Exploiting the Poor: Housing, Markets, and Vulnerability, 126 YALE L.J.F. 458 (2017).
123. Alicia Mazzara, Federal Rental Assistance Provides Affordable Homes for Vulnerable People
in All Types of Communities, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.cb
pp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-9-17hous.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C6T-EL5L] (noting that
“[f]or every assisted household in the United States, roughly three renter households pay half or more
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with higher incomes who can afford a newly constructed unit, a lot is
riding on the housing market successfully increasing supply when there
are demand shocks.
Unfortunately, in many of the country’s economically dynamic cities,
land use regulations effectively block increases in the supply of
housing.124 The generational push outward from the cities to the suburbs
that followed World War II, driven by white flight from desegregated
areas, subsidized credit, and public infrastructure investment, resulted in
the then familiar patterns of white, wealthier suburbs and darker, poorer
urban centers.125 Though the central city retained many of the jobs, whites
retreated at night to the suburbs and suburban governments resisted
development as a way to protect the high level of services, particularly in
terms of K-12 education, that their residents expected.
Given that education is funded largely though local property taxes,
suburbs sought to maximize tax revenue and minimize demands on city
services.126 This practical calculus, combined with a desire to keep out
communities of color, meant privileged suburbs blocked denser, more
affordable housing that predictably would have housed poorer families
whose tax contributions would not cover the public service expenses

of their income for housing across urban, suburban, and rural areas”); see also CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, UNITED STATES FEDERAL RENTAL ASSISTANCE FACT SHEETS (2021), https://w
ww.cbpp.org/research/housing/federal-rental-assistance-fact-sheets#US [https://perma.cc/B547-CG
WN] (“24 million low-income American renters pay more than half their income for housing. Most
don’t receive rental assistance due to funding limitations.”).
124. See generally Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply, in 5
HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 1289 (Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson &
William C. Strange eds., 2015) (reviewing theories and studies on why regulations arise and
discussing the implications of those regulations).
125. In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson appointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders to investigate the underlying forces behind the riots of the 1960s. The commission released
what is known as the Kerner Report which noted that the continued segregation in American cities
was reinforced by white flight. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 5 (1968) (“White racism is essentially
responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of
World War II. Among the ingredients of this mixture . . . [is]: Black in-migration and white exodus,
which have produced the massive and growing concentrations of impoverished Negroes in our major
cities, creating a growing crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and unmet human needs.”); see
also Leah Platt Boustan, Was Postwar Suburbanization “White Flight”? Evidence from the Black
Migration, 125 Q.J. ECON. 417, 438 (2010). (“My estimates suggest that the change in racial diversity
associated with black migration resulted in a 17% decline in urban population.”).
126. See Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation for
Exclusionary Zoning, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 665, 668–69 (1987) (“Each municipality has an individually
rational motive for implementing noncompetitive policies like exclusionary zoning: protection of its
fiscal base.”).
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associated with them.127 What was true of privileged suburbs is now also
true of many cities that have become attractive places to work and live.
Once interest in living in the cities rebounded, prohibitive land use
practices—exclusionary regulations, expensive and uncertain permitting
processes, and local opposition to new development—moved from
privileged suburbs to the urban core.128 As a result, in dynamic
metropolitan regions, the same basic exclusionary approach is now
common to both the central city and their surrounding suburbs. This
alignment of restrictive land use practices is tragic for a number of reasons
and it is worth exploring what led to this point.
D.

The Rebound of the City

Cities are on the rise. One explanation for their rise focuses on
agglomeration effects, the ways in which physical proximity can catalyze
economic growth. The classic modern example is a would-be entrepreneur
with some computer skills. Such a person might be able to use those skills
in a rural part of the country or in places like Columbus, Ohio but will
have a much richer experience in Silicon Valley.129 There the would-be
entrepreneur will find a peer group actively engaged in similar work.130
The chance that such a person will find out about new opportunities, learn
new relevant skills, and even be in a position to take a chance on a new

127. Note, State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1127–28 (1995). Suburbs unable to engage in these exclusionary practices can
find that expenses can rise faster than revenue, creating ongoing political difficulties. See Angela
Marie Simms, Power, Privilege, And Peril: Governing in a Suburban Majority Black and Middle
Class County—A Regional Perspective (2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania)
(ScholarlyCommons) (exploring the challenges facing Prince George County, a majority Black
suburban area outside of Washington, D.C.).
128. Intense anti-development sentiment in local districts, combined with municipal governance
processes that limit attention to particular proposals, arguably help explain why cities are replicating
the exclusionary practices of suburbs. See Schleicher, supra note 119, at 1670. One possible solution
would be for cities to adopt a proactive approach to urban planning and zoning rather than merely
reacting to proposals piecemeal. See Sara C. Bronin, Comprehensive Rezonings, 2019 BYU L. REV.
725 (2019); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 91 (2015).
129. For a particularly influential account of what draws educated people to superstar cities, see
RICHARD FLORIDA, CITIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS 36 (2005) (explaining that the creative class
looks for communities that have “abundant high-quality experiences,” are open to “diversity of all
kinds,” and that “validate their identities as creative people”).
130. Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215, 232 (2016) (“Finally, cities increase productivity as proximity facilitates
the rapid transmission of ideas. . . . [W]hen individuals engaged in the same skilled trade live in close
proximity ‘[t]he mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air, and children
learn many of them unconsciously.’” (quoting ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 271
(8th ed. 2013))).
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product is much higher. There is a positive feedback loop to proximity.131
This is true whether the city is San Francisco (tech), New York (finance
and fashion), Los Angeles (film), Hartford (insurance), or Boston (health
and education).132 Attention to agglomeration effects entered the legal
scholarly literature primarily through the work of a few prolific professors
but has since become a widely-accepted way of understanding urban
economies.133 As they and others have shown, agglomeration enables
some cities in the United States, so-called “superstar cities,” to go on an
economic tear while others continue to decline.134 The economic potential
unleashed through proximity and concentration effects helps explain why
the Bay Area produces almost 20% of the nation’s patents and how “[t]he
New York metropolitan area generates more economic output than
Australia or Spain.”135
Societal changes also played a role in elevating cities. Those who grew
up in the suburbs following the middle and upper-class rush to the suburbs
in the mid-twentieth century arguably understand the downsides of living
in the endless meandering streets and endless cul-de-sacs and tract-home
suburbia better than others, including their parents.136 Especially as the
urban frontier pushed ever outward in search of developable land, more

131. David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1515–
28 (2010) (highlighting reduced transportation costs, market depth, and information spillovers as
economic advantages associated with urban proximity).
132. Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew G. Resseger, The Complementarity Between Cities and Skills,
50 J. REG’L SCI. 221, 241–42 (2010) (Figures 3 and 4 demonstrating that the primary indicator of
increased information spillover is population density and level of education, showing similar levels
across highly educated cities with varied industries like San Francisco, Boston, Hartford, and New
York).
133. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative
Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262–63 (2010) (providing
a summary of the proximity advantages associated with urban clustering). See generally Edward L.
Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration Economies and Spatial
Equilibrium in the United States, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 983 (2009) (discussing agglomeration economics
and comparative advantages of cities).
134. Vicki Been, City NIMBYs, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 217, 230 (2018) (“The value of
agglomeration is substantial. While New York City, San Francisco, and San Jose, for example, have
4% of the nation’s population, they are responsible for 12.6% of the nation’s gross national product.”);
David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 96
(2017) (“[L]ocation matters. When people and capital congregate in particular cities and regions, they
learn and trade more easily, and this creates wealth and generates economic growth.”).
135. Eduardo Porter, Coronavirus Threatens the Luster of Superstar Cities, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/business/economy/coronavirus-cities.html [https://per
ma.cc/29LZ-TYKZ].
136. See Amir Efrati, The Suburbs Under Siege, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2006, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114921327859169468 [https://perma.cc/W6M3-5U8B] (“The
influx of homes in the suburbs, and the traffic they bring, has become the chief concern of planners
across the nation, many of whom are struggling to mitigate the impact of car culture.”).
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people came to understand the toll that the long commutes and need to
drive everywhere can have on happiness and health.137 Since the early
1990s, the combined effect of declining crime rates and sustained
economic growth has made cities safer and more attractive, contributing
to the increased interest in city living.138 With cities are no longer
perceived as sites of danger, the upper middle class could imagine life
outside of sealed off, isolated suburbs.
Race emerged as a complicating factor rather than as an alldeterminative one. Over time, desegregation and laws such as the Fair
Housing Act cracked open the suburbs to minority households.139 Wealthy
whites could still expect their suburb would remain majority white, but
African-Americans and Latinos were now part of these once racially
exclusive communities. As historically excluded racial groups entered
inner ring suburbs, white flight continued but in new forms.140 And in the
city, young white professionals (including members of the LGBT
community) moved into—gentrified—neighborhoods adjacent to existing
communities of color.141 Racism did not go away, but in taking on new
forms and finding new outlets (including the war on crime), it changed in
137. See Eagle, supra note 7, at 126 (highlighting “a reduced tolerance for commuting” as a
contributing factor for urban gentrification).
138. Mangin, supra note 119, at 92; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES! THE ECONOMICS OF
LAND USE REGULATION 298 (2015) (observing that “the crime decline is durable and has made big
cities more attractive to residents who in former times would have headed for the suburbs”); see also
RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,
2018, at 1–3 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv18.pdf [https://perma.cc/77T8-ZDRN];
John Gramlich, What the Data Says (and Doesn’t Say) About Crime in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/17/facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/K2JL-TCAN].
139. For more on efforts to open up the suburbs to non-white households, see CHRISTOPHER
BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE
THE SUBURBS (2006).
140. See Lindsay Haines, The Effects of White Flight and Urban Decay in Suburban Cook County,
18 PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 18, 25 (2010) (“[T]he models support the idea that the suburbs are
experiencing urban decline similar to inner-cities in that white flight produces negative economic and
social outcomes.”); see also Greta Kaul, White Flight Didn’t Disappear—It Just Moved to the
Suburbs, MINNPOST (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2018/03/whiteflight-didn-t-disappear-it-just-moved-suburbs/ [https://perma.cc/WNX3-NATQ] (discussing white
flight from racially-integrating suburbs); cf. Samuel H. Kye, The Persistence of White Flight in
Middle-Class Suburbia, 72 SOC. SCI. RES. 38, 49 (2018) (arguing that white flight continues even
after minorities have moved into suburban neighborhoods: “Ultimately, results show virtually no
evidence supporting the racial proxy hypothesis. Instead, findings demonstrate that the odds of white
flight are significantly greater for all groups in middle-class neighborhoods, rather than their poorer
counterparts. Additionally, predicted probabilities provide strong evidence confirming the
independent effects of non-white racial/ethnic group presence—most notably for Hispanic and Asian
residents—in driving white flight in middle-class neighborhoods”).
141. See, e.g., DEREK S. HYRA, RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN THE CAPPUCCINO CITY 65, 67
(2017) (discussing how these pressures played out in the gentrification of Washington, D.C.).
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ways that opened up the cities for a return migration of upper middle class
white households while simultaneously eroding the suburb’s status as a
protected racial enclave.142
E.

Closing the Gates to the City

As society and demographics changed, how cities approach
development changed as well. The model for how scholars understand
suburban and urban land use regulation broke down. For decades,
property scholars relied on Professor William Fischel’s “homevoter
hypothesis” to explain the exclusionary zoning practices of suburbs.143
According to the homevoter hypothesis, homeowners, intent on protecting
their single largest investment, their homes, dominate suburban politics.144
New development threatens their home values, so they fight against things
like new apartment buildings or the construction of affordable housing
units. Having made it into the suburbs, homeowners do their best to lock
the gate behind them, shutting out any late arriving groups.145 Indeed,
homeowners do more than just cut off supply—they also increase the
value of their homes using zoning tools such as minimum lot size
requirements and time-consuming review processes to make it
prohibitively expensive to build anything other than high-end housing.146
A combination of rational self-interest and racial animus sealed off the
suburbs from the linked threats of growth and of an influx of less wealthy,
often African-American or Latino, households.147
Scholars contrasted suburban exclusion with the generally prodevelopment orientation of central cities.148 If politics in the suburbs were
142. See Norrinda Brown Hayat, Urban Decolonization, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 75, 98 (2018)
(“[A]s a result of reurbanization, elite enclaves expand into historically Black neighborhoods, the new
occupants have displaced the old occupants to varying degrees.”).
143. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
144. Id. at 18 (arguing that “mercenary concern with property values, especially that of
homeowners, motivates citizens to organize and make personal sacrifices for such things as public
schools and amenable environments”).
145. But see FISCHEL, supra note 138, at 197–99 (pushing back on this explanation of suburban
growth controls).
146. As a Brookings Institution report highlights, formal restrictions as well as long or uncertain
permitting processes can raise the price of housing. JENNY SCHUETZ, BROOKINGS INST., IS ZONING A
USEFUL TOOL OR A REGULATORY BARRIER? (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-zoninga-useful-tool-or-a-regulatory-barrier/ [https://perma.cc/CZZ7-EDQ9].
147. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning for Density: Promises, Perils and a Paradox, 33 J. LAND
USE & ENV’T L. 1, 6 (2017) (laying out the regionalist argument against suburbs, which includes
racism as a motivating factor in the exit to the suburbs).
148. For an extended discussion of this contrast and an argument that homevoters are powerful
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driven by the homevoter hypothesis, city politicians were understood as
beholden to “the growth machine,” developers, real estate professionals,
and bankers, who were actively engaged in city elections and who
benefited from urban growth.149 Cities, according to the growth machine
understanding of urban land use, were more welcoming of everything
from commercial and industrial activities to apartment buildings and,
even, affordable housing.150 Cities therefore provided an escape valve for
some of the pent-up regional development demand that otherwise would
have been built in the suburbs. Notably, the homevoter hypothesis and the
growth machine were linked, two sides of the same coin. The breakdown
occurred when cities started closing their own gates, following the
suburban model in blocking off new development that threatened their
emerging exclusivity.151 High-end retail and white-collar jobs were still
welcome, but cities would no longer be growth machines when it came to
housing.
The political power of tenants and communities of color already living
in the city helped push cities from the growth machine norm to an
exclusionary approach. The anti-growth mindset normally associated with
homevoters found expression in the urban space through the concern that
development would harm tenants, especially communities of color.
Advocates and community activists believed that new development would
displace existing communities, resulting in gentrification and
displacement.152 Community groups fought against market-supported
construction because they believed current residents would not benefit
from new high-end apartment complexes and retail spaces catering to the

even in urban spaces, see Vicki Been, Josiah Madar & Simon McDonnell, Urban Land-Use
Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 227
(2014).
149. See Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,
82 AM. J. SOCIO. 309 (1976); Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in Making
Land Use Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 293, 335 (2002) (“The growth machine model
also correlates well with certain empirical observations about local government practices. For
example, observers have noted evidence of some bias in municipal planning bodies toward
development, while other commentators have periodically suggested that the real estate industry
unduly influences the land use decision making process.”).
150. But see Been et al., supra note 148, at 259 (arguing that “the land-use politics of large cities
are not as different from those of the suburbs as theorists, policymakers, and judges have assumed”).
151. See generally Been, supra note 134.
152. See, e.g., John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two”:
Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 469–76
(2003) (highlighting studies that found that gentrification leads to displacement); Bethany Y. Li, Now
Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Displacement in the Age of Hypergentrification, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2016) (differentiating revitalization from gentrification with the key
difference being that gentrification is associated with displacement).
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upper middle class.153 The anti-growth argument could take on
deterministic elements: the arrival of a Whole Foods, an upscale gym, or
a new loft-style apartment building thought to signal that an area had been
gentrified and the area was now claimed by young urban professionals
(yuppies) returning to the city.154 The notion that existing communities
might benefit from such amenities, increase in economic activity, and
additional supply of housing was rejected.155 Consequently, the fight
against gentrification and displacement became a fight against growth;
cities, often led by progressive coalition governments, responded by
making development more difficult just as cities surged in popularity and
demand.
Cities did not shut down the growth machine entirely. Even as it
became progressively harder for housing at any price point to be built,
cities and regions continued to seek out and permit business expansion
within city limits.156 But for active efforts by cities and their surrounding
suburbs to block new construction, economic booms that make a region
attractive to in-movers should lead to only a temporary increase in the cost
of housing. Seeing surging demand and the potential for above average
returns, the market should respond with a corresponding increase in new
housing starts. Although housing prices at the start of a regional growth
spurt might be elevated over the combined cost of land and construction
expenses, with time the market correction should limit both the duration
and the extent of extraordinary price increases. With time, regional
population and regional housing supply should increase to reflect that
relative attractiveness of the employment opportunities available in these
dynamic cities. But that is not what is happening. Instead, layers of land
153. See, e.g., Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification
and Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. STUD. 23, 44–49 (2006) (explaining how
community organizers support the informal housing market as a way of resisting displacement in New
York); Hannah Weinstein, Fighting for a Place Called Home: Litigation Strategies for Challenging
Gentrification, 62 UCLA L. REV. 794 (2015) (detailing tools such as litigation using inclusionary
zoning laws, environmental impact statements, FHA prohibitions on adverse impact on racial
minorities to halt gentrification).
154. For a bit of humor about gentrification, see (literally), Michael Che, White Women Took
Brooklyn, YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=if_sEUffzjE [https://perma.
cc/NB8W-2QPP].
155. But see Adam Sternbergh, What’s Wrong with Gentrification?, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 30, 2009),
https://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/62675/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) (defending gentrification
as better than blight or abandonment).
156. See, e.g., MADELINE BARON, MARLEY BUCHMAN, MIKE KINGSELLA, RANDALL POZDENA &
MICHAEL WILKERSON, HOUSING UNDERPRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA 5 (2018),
https://www.upforgrowth.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/UFG_CA_HousingUnderproduction_Proo
f_12.12.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G9M-X98J] (highlighting how California’s “unprecedented
economic growth over the last decade” has led to upwards spiraling housing costs because of the
“severe underproduction [of housing] over time”).

Rosser (Do Not Delete)

2021]

10/19/21 1:43 PM

THE EUCLID PROVISO

841

use regulations are effectively preventing the housing market from
responding to increased demand, resulting in spiraling housing costs and
little population growth in cities, regions, and entire states that are
otherwise booming.157
F.

Permanent Single-Family Zoning

Two recent linked articles by Professor Robert Ellickson, a tireless
critic of land use regulations that impose costs on housing developers,
illustrate the profound impact zoning has on the urban housing market.158
Starting with the observation that municipal zoning “is arguably the most
consequential regulatory program in the United States,” Ellickson shows
how large lot zoning and other zoning hurdles severely limit housing
construction in urban areas.159 Taking a regional approach, Zoning and the
Cost of Housing focuses on the thirty-seven suburbs and four localities in
Silicon Valley, the greater New Haven area, and the greater Austin
region.160 Ellickson found that the suburbs in his study “set aside 91.0%
of their residentially zoned land (70.7% of their total land area)
exclusively for detached single-family use.”161 Large minimum lot sizes,
ranging from more modest 5,000 square feet minimum in East Palo Alto
to Guilford, Connecticut’s whopping four acre minimum that applies to
61% of its residentially zoned land, exacerbate the problem of pervasive
SFH zoning.162 As Ellickson shows, even when the area is undergoing
tremendous growth, as Silicon Valley has for several decades, zoning
regulations make it nearly impossible for the market to respond to the

157. See, e.g., Eric Kober, The Bay Area: The Land of Many Jobs and Too Few Homes,
ECONOMICS21 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://economics21.org/bay-area-the-land-of-many-jobs-and-toofew-homes [https://perma.cc/92PX-ADY8] (presenting the widening gap between increases in nonfarm labor and new housing permits in the San Francisco and San Mateo Counties between 2010 and
2019); BARON ET. AL., supra note 156, at 9 (noting that “[d]espite a robust and growing economy,
California has experienced the slowest population growth rate of any state on the west coast from
2010 to 2017—about the same rate as Montana and half the rate of growth of Utah”).
158. Robert C. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing: Evidence from Silicon Valley, Greater
New Haven, and Greater Austin 5 (Jan. 13, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing]; Robert C. Ellickson, The Zoning StraitJacket: The Freezing of American Neighborhoods of Single-Family Homes, 96 IND. L.J. 395, 418
(2021) [hereinafter Ellickson, The Zoning Strait-Jacket].
159. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing, supra note 158, at 5; see also Bronin, supra note
128, at 727 (“Of all powers given to local governments, the power to zone is one of the most
significant.”).
160. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing, supra note 158, at 6.
161. Id. at 15–16.
162. Id. at 17–20. See generally Paul Boudreaux, Lotting Large: The Phenomenon of Minimum Lot
Size Laws, 68 ME. L. REV. 1 (2016) (discussing the problem of large lot sizes nationwide).
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increased demand for new housing.163 The result: stagnant population
growth, sky-high housing costs, and mega-commutes for those locked
out.164 In contrast, regions like the Greater Austin have kept both the
exclusionary impulse and housing prices in check because they are more
open to development, facilitate utility connections, and historically
granted the central city broad annexation authority.165
The Zoning Strait-Jacket, Ellickson’s companion article, highlights the
extent to which single-family housing zones become fixed zones, frozen
in time and immune to regional development pressures.166
Neighborhoods, Ellickson argues, “remain virtually unchanged,” partly as
a result of the initial investment but also because land use regulation
“almost invariably works to freeze land uses in a neighborhood of
houses.”167 When it comes to existing areas zoned for single family
detached houses, “with rare exception, local zoning rules forbid
construction of denser residential structures, even duplexes.”168 The
zoning strait-jacket described by Ellickson functions in much the same
way as a SFH restrictive covenant, securing to homeowners a great deal
of security and certainty that their neighborhood will remain zoned solely

163. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing, supra note 158, at 31–47.
164. See San Francisco, California Population 2021, WORLD POPULATION REV. (2021),
https://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/san-francisco-ca-population [https://perma.cc/HE7U-P
Z7L] (finding that between 2010 to 2020, the San Francisco metro area grew at an annual rate between
zero and one-and-a-half percent); Sunaina Kathpalia, The District’s Population Grows for the 14th
Year in a Row, but at a Weaker Rate, D.C. POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.dcpolicycenter
.org/publications/districts-population-grows-14th-year-row-weaker-rate/ [https://perma.cc/G3EG-X
47S] (finding that net outmigration for D.C. began in 2018 and investigating immigration and
emigration in the neighboring metropolitan area); William H. Frey, Even Before the Coronavirus,
Census Shows U.S. Cities’ Growth Was Stagnating, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/even-before-coronavirus-census-shows-u-s-cities-growth-wasstagnating/ [https://perma.cc/B8HL-G3M3]; MAC TAYLOR, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., CALIFORNIA’S
HIGH HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 7–9 (2015), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/fi
nance/housing-costs/housing-costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UPS-NSG3] (presenting data that
“California’s [h]ome [p]rices and [r]ents [h]ave [r]isen [f]aster [t]han [the] U.S. [a]verage [s]ince the
1940s” among other housing issues); Sydney Bennet, Rise of the Super Commuters: 1 in 36 American
Commuters Travel 90+ Minutes to Work Each Day, APARTMENT LIST (Apr. 24, 2018), https://w
ww.apartmentlist.com/research/increase-in-long-super-commutes [https://perma.cc/5AVM-BU7X]
(reporting that “[o]f the ten cities with the most super commuters, eight of them fall into three regions
close to the superstar cities of San Francisco, Los Angeles and New York City” while presenting
plenty of data on the increase of super-commuters around metropolitan areas).
165. See Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing, supra note 158, at 68–78.
166. See Ellickson, The Zoning Strait-Jacket, supra note 158.
167. Id. at 3. For more on the investment reason, the ways in which investments in an initial time
period can work to fix or limit the uses of land in future time periods, see Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land
Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829–32 (2009) (discussing land’s “memory,” which refers to the
ways land development decisions have lasting consequences).
168. Ellickson, The Zoning Strait-Jacket, supra note 158, at 47.
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for SFHs.169 The difference is that the ossification of zoning—its
permanence when it comes to areas of residential detached homes even in
cities experiencing increasing demand—involves the exercise of state
power supposedly for the public welfare. This is not a small problem with
minor consequences, for this “zoning strait-jacket binds a large majority
of urban land in the United States.”170 Combined, Zoning and the Cost of
Housing and The Zoning Strait-Jacket convincingly demonstrate that land
use regulations, often in the form of excessive protection of the SFH, in
practice operate to permanently lock up land across metropolitan regions.
In regions experiencing economic growth, these regulations contribute
significantly to the problems of undersupply and unaffordability that
plague urban housing markets.
For those familiar with Ellickson’s past work, his conclusion in these
two articles—that over-regulation has (wrongly) depressed housing
supply—is hardly surprising. A prolific scholar, Ellickson’s previous
targets for attack include inclusionary zoning,171 rent control,172 public
housing’s move towards mixed-income housing,173 and even the idea that
people should have a right to shelter.174 One way to view Ellickson’s
scholarship is a tireless focus, spanning several decades, on the ways in
which policies designed to help the poor when it comes to housing
paradoxically harm them by undermining how markets work.175 This law
and economics approach and the particular conclusions Ellickson reached
on inclusionary zoning, rent control, and the like are an anathema to the
left and Ellickson’s career has inspired a whole response literature.176 As

169. For a classic case on the power of SFH-restrictive covenants to protect homeowners even in
the face of neighborhood changes, see W. Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 495 P.2d 624, 625–28 (Nev. 1972)
(acknowledging growth and development changes in the area immediately surrounding a covenant
protected SFH community in Reno but holding in favor of enforcing the SFH restriction).
170. Ellickson, The Zoning Strait-Jacket, supra note 158, at 4.
171. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981).
172. See Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olson, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947
(1991).
173. See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 983 (2010).
174. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (1992).
175. There is nothing new to this move: it is arguably the default law and economics response to
progressive policies in property law and in other areas of the law. See Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing
Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 432–33 (2015) (describing this move in more detail).
176. See, e.g., Robert Deal, The Judicial Invention of Property Norms: Ellickson’s Whalemen
Revisited, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 73 (2013) (critiquing Ellickson’s argument that whaling customs
became the law of whaling); Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982) (arguing that Ellickson’s celebration of homeowners associations is primarily
ideological, not empirical).
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Ellickson excoriated land use regulations that add to development costs,
the mainstream left played at the margins. Hoping that by providing a
layer of rights to poor people—in the form of everything from eviction
defense and court reform to the implied warranty of habitability and anticondo conversion rules—the law could alter urban growth patterns, the
left fought a rear-guard action.177 There is tremendous value to this work
and this section should not be considered a critique of it, but it is work
largely premised on a fixed or shrinking pie.
G.

Supply Neglect and Denial

When it comes to discussing the housing market, the academic left
generally has not taken increases to supply through new construction
seriously. Thus, for example, when debates about the implied warranty of
habitability raged in the 1970s and 1980s between liberals or crits (those
we now know as progressives or retired Marxists) and conservatives or
law and economics scholars (those we now know as conservatives or law
and economics scholars), the hostile political environment meant that the
best the left could do was argue that in some cities, with some market
conditions, the implied warranty of habitability (IWH) would not
necessarily, in all circumstances, reduce supply.178 Left-leaning scholars
showed that the implied warranty can prevent the premature destruction
of some units by landlords “milking” rental properties (allowing units to
deteriorate by not maintaining them as a way to maximize returns on
rental investments).179 They also demonstrated that the implied warranty
of habitability arguably can be imposed on a very hot market without

177. As Professor David Super notes about the signature doctrinal shift in support of the rights of
tenants, the implied warranty of habitability, “[t]he narrow lesson of the failure of the implied
warranty of habitability is that direct subsidies have far more potential than regulatory action to
improve low-income tenants’ housing conditions.” David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389, 461 (2011).
178. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income
Housing: “Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485 (1987) (showing that in some
circumstances the implied warranty could protect units against decay and abandonment); Bruce
Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing
Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971) (arguing that code
enforcement can redistribute income from landlords to tenants in a way that landlords will not always
be able to recover from tenants); see also Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing and Code Enforcement:
Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 33, 40–42 (2006)
(describing the debate and collecting sources). For a well-done documentary on the rise and fall of
critical legal studies, see Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Crits (2021), https://today.law.harvard.edu/bookreview/the-influence-of-critical-legal-studies/ [https://perma.cc/6QJG-GSSX].
179. See Kennedy, supra note 178, at 489–98 (defining “milking”).
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necessarily altering developer investment decisions.180
Even recognizing the significant contributions these arguments made
at the time, these are more nuanced and less powerful arguments
compared to the right’s rhetorical position that added costs inevitably will
reduce the supply of new housing. With the exception of advocating for
government housing subsidies and pushing for housing on a piecemeal
basis for particular projects or as part of community economic
development program at the neighborhood level, the left traditionally has
had very little to say about how the law might be changed at a structural
level to allow for new construction that could increase the supply of
private housing.181
Indeed, rather than being indifferent to supply, a segment of the
affordable housing advocacy community rejects the idea that market
additions to the housing stock supply can help ordinary people.182 Most
poor people live in market supplied housing, not in public housing.183
Because the amount that the poor can pay for housing is not enough to
cover construction and maintenance costs, the market cannot build new
units for the poor without subsidies.184 But through downward filtering,
180. See Ackerman, supra note 178, at 1117 (presenting an argument that the code enforcement
would not discourage new housing construction).
181. See Mangin, supra note 119, at 93–94 (noting that the housing advocacy community tends to
focus on policies “that can actually prevent new development and end up increasing housing prices”
and arguing that the housing advocacy community should “abandon its reflexively anti-development
sentiments and embrace an agenda that accepts and advocates for increased housing development of
all types” (emphasis omitted)).
182. See, e.g., Ana Aguirre, Bishop David Benke, Michelle Neugebauer & Robert Santiago,
CityViews: For East New York’s Housing Crunch, Supply Is Not the Solution, CITYLIMITS (Feb. 18,
2016), https://citylimits.org/2016/02/18/cityviewsfor-east-new-yorks-housing-crunch-supply-is-notthe-solution/ [https://perma.cc/M5J4-W5UJ] (“Simply put, inviting significantly more building in
low-income communities without guarantees that most or all of the new housing will be affordable to
current residents may increase, not reduce the risk of displacement. The only increase in housing
supply that will help to alleviate New York’s affordable housing crisis is housing that is truly
affordable to low-income and working-class people. Opening the floodgates to new market-rate
development is not the way to build a more equitable city, and we urge the city to reject this strategy
for East New York and citywide.” (emphasis omitted)).
183. See Andrew Flowers, Why So Many Poor Americans Don’t Get Help Paying for Housing,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 16, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-so-manypoor-americans-dont-get-help-paying-for-housing/ [https://perma.cc/A3Y2-EY58] (“[T]he vast
majority of low-income families don’t receive any housing support. . . . 15 percent [of families at or
below the poverty line] live in public housing . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
184. See Elizabeth A. Graddy & Raphael W. Bostic, The Role of Private Agents in Affordable
Housing Policy, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY, i81, i83 (2010) (“The basic challenge to
providing affordable housing is that in the places it is needed most, the rents and sale prices required
to make a residence affordable for lower income households do not support financially feasible
projects. Put another way, in places facing affordable housing challenges, the rents and sales prices
needed for a development project to cover construction and other development costs typically far
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the trickling down of units originally built for middle and upper class
buyers, some market rate housing eventually becomes available at lower
price points.185 The trickle-down description of the housing market—
relying as it does on the same basic mechanism for benefits to reach
ordinary people—sounds and functions like the largely discredited trickledown theory of economics.186
Additional luxury condos in a gentrifying part of downtown or in an
exclusive suburb, according to some housing advocates, are not going to
exceed those that can be afforded by lower income (and some middle-income) households.”);
FRANCISO NICCO-ANNAN, FANNIE MAE, MULTIFAMILY MARKET COMMENTARY—MARCH 2017
(2017), https://www.fanniemae.com/media/23036/display
[https://perma.cc/7C7K-3B6M]
(presenting data on the rising cost of constructing multifamily-housing). There are some forms of
housing, including trailers and informal housing in colonias, that arguably are affordable to those with
low socio-economic status, but they are often marked by low quality construction and infrastructure
problems. See, e.g., Katherine MacTavish, Michelle Eley & Sonya Salamon, Housing Vulnerability
Among Rural Trailer-Park Households, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95 (2006) (discussing
the challenges of living in mobile home communities); Peter M. Ward, Flavio de Souza, Cecilia Giusti
& Jane E. Larson, El Título en la Mano: The Impact of Titling Programs on Low-Income Housing in
Texas Colonias, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2011) (exploring the inequities of limited forms of
ownership in colonias).
185. For background analysis on the theory of downward filtering in the housing market, see S.
Burlington Twp. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 741 (N.J. 1975) (Pashman, J.,
concurring) (“The brunt of this shortage is, of course, borne by persons with low or moderate
incomes. . . . In theory, low and moderate income families should benefit even from construction of
new housing which they themselves cannot afford because such housing creates vacancies which
‘filter down.’ In reality, however, most of these vacancies are absorbed by the enormous lag between
population growth and new housing construction. The housing which does ‘filter down’ to persons
with low or moderate incomes is often badly dilapidated and in deteriorating neighborhoods.”
(citations omitted)); Boudreaux, supra note 28, at 635–38 (providing an extended, celebratory
overview of filtering); Mangin, supra note 119, at 102–03 (describing downward and upward
filtering); Ira S. Lowry, Filtering and Housing Standards: A Conceptual Analysis, 36 LAND ECON.
362, 363 (1960) (“I propose to define ‘filtering’ simply as a change in the real value (price in constant
dollars) of an existing dwelling. . . . By this definition the dwelling unit can filter up in value as well
as down; occupancy may change as a consequence, or it may not; other units may be similarly
affected, or not.” (emphasis omitted)); Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The
Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 43–45 (1996)
(“Conceptually, the filter theory sees the housing market as two ladders. On the supply ladder are
houses, arranged according to quality. On the demand ladder are housing consumers, arranged
according to income. When a new house is built at the top of the supply ladder, the highest person on
the demand ladder moves into it, leaving an old house vacant. Since this vacant house is better than
the house belonging to the second highest family on the demand ladder, that family sells and moves
into the now second best house on the supply ladder. The process continues, and every consumer
eventually moves up a notch.”).
186. For more on the failure of the trickle-down theory of economics, see Daphne T. Greenwood
& Richard P. F. Holt, Growth, Inequality and Negative Trickle Down, 44 J. ECON. ISSUES 403, 408–
09 (2010) (arguing that concentrated income growth has not trickled down in the United States and
instead has lowered many people’s well-being, lowered provision of public goods, and increased
competition for limited housing resources); and Shu-Chun Susan Yang, Do Capital Income Tax Cuts
Trickle Down?, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 551, 551–53 (2007) (demonstrating that welfare gains from capital
income tax cuts—alone—do not trickle down, to highlight that “tax liability changes are a poor proxy
for welfare changes”).
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improve the housing market experience of lower income households.187
Taking a particularly hostile view of supply, some advocates go so far as
to argue that additional high-end housing harms those already dealing
with unaffordable housing. By making an area more attractive to the
wealthy, advocates argue that new construction can induce additional
demand, leading to greater displacement pressure on existing residents.188
According to this view, new market rate housing reduces the land
available for subsidized housing in areas that are already substantially
developed.189 By rejecting the basic economic principle that increased
supply should lead to price decreases in all but extreme circumstances
marked by perfect inelasticity, some affordable housing and community
advocates have painted themselves into a corner. They now find
themselves simultaneously embracing urban NIMBY-ism when it comes
to market rate construction while also decrying the undersupply of
affordable housing.
H.

Supply Matters
Ultimately, progressive hostility to the notion that supply matters is not

187. It is worth noting that gentrification can lead to improved services and amenities that may
benefit lower-income residents. See Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and
Displacement: New York City in the 1990s, 70 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 39, 51 (2007) (“[G]entrification
brings with it neighborhood improvements that are valued by disadvantaged households, and they
consequently make greater efforts to remain in their dwelling units, even if the proportion of the
income devoted to rent rises.”); J. Peter Bryne, Rhetoric and Realities of Gentrification: Reply to
Powell and Spencer, 46 HOW. L.J. 491, 494–95 (2003) (“I see gentrification creating new
opportunities for existing low-income residents in terms of jobs, shopping, and education . . . . [B]oth
common sense and available data suggest that for many poor residents, increased job opportunities,
personal safety, and amenities provide a context in which they can improve their economic standing
and claim their citizenship.”).
188. See James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive Planning
Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J.
ENV’T L. & POL’Y 45, 67 (2003) (“Under gentrification, a consumer preference for urban living
causes developers to increase rents, displacing the poor into a dwindling supply of decent housing,
resulting in landlord exploitation, excessive rent costs, overcrowding, or the outright expulsion from
the city or entry intro homelessness.”); Dietderich, supra note 185, at 97 (discussing gentrification
and noting that “the total amount of space possessed by the wealthy increases, while the total amount
of space possessed by the poor decreases”); Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation
Between Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 798 (1993) (“As new units were created on the high-end of the ladder, older
units at the bottom depreciated until they were abandoned.”).
189. See also Lance Freeman & Jenny Schuetz, Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets:
What Works?, 19 CITYSCAPE 217, 227 (2017) (detailing how new higher-market-rate housing
together with limited land availability creates strains on low- and moderate-income households); J.
Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix
Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 551 (2007) (arguing that “[m]aintaining affordable units may
stem the tide or mitigate the displacement effects of gentrification[] in an appreciating neighborhood,
[and that] maintaining subsidized housing may be the only way to maintain economic diversity”).
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well grounded. As Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen, and Katherine
O’Regan show in Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability,
there is no empirical support for the anti-development position of supply
skeptics.190 Their article notes that “[d]espite the arguments raised by
supply skeptics, there is a considerable body of empirical research
showing that less restrictive land-use regulation is associated with lower
prices.”191 The article methodically responds to the arguments of supply
skeptics. The article shows that even with land constraints, housing supply
can expand and should lead to price decreases.192 Furthermore, new
construction at the top end of the housing market can have a cascade effect
across multiple market segments; by relieving high end demand pressure,
fewer units should filter upward, helping with general affordability even
for those not able to afford the new units.193 Though new construction
might induce additional demand, the market effects of additional supply
overwhelm any induced demand effects.194 Similarly, while the article
concedes that new construction could lead to higher rents, what little
empirical work has been done on the issue has reached the opposite
conclusion, that additional market supply reduces displacement in the
immediate area.195 “In sum,” the authors argue, “the preponderance of the
evidence shows that restricting supply increases housing prices and that
adding supply would help to make housing more affordable.”196 The
article’s analysis is restrained: even as it marshalled study after study to
show that supply skeptics are wrong, it does not treat the intuitions behind
supply skepticism dismissively.
Others are less restrained in their criticism of supply skeptics. Professor
Michael Lewyn likens supply skepticism to climate change denial: “Just
as a place where climate change denialism is rampant is likely to adopt
anti-environmental policies, a city pockmarked with supply-and-demand
denialism is likely to adopt anti-supply policies such as restrictive zoning
and laws that discourage people from becoming landlords.”197 Sonja
190. Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply
and Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25 (2019).
191. Id. at 26.
192. Id. at 28.
193. Id. at 28–29.
194. Id. at 30.
195. Id. at 31.
196. Id. at 27.
197. Michael Lewyn, Supply and Demand Denialism, PLANETIZEN (Feb. 10, 2015, 2:00 PM),
https://www.planetizen.com/node/73728/supply-and-demand-denialism [https://perma.cc/QZ8G-C9
VM]; see also Michael Lewyn, Supply-and-Demand Denial and Climate Change Denial, MARKET
URBANISM (Apr. 12, 2016), https://marketurbanism.com/2016/04/12/supply-and-demand-denial-an
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Trauss, founder of San Francisco Bay Area Renters’ Federation (SF
BARF), used her organization to push for lower zoning and environmental
regulations in order to increase supply of both market rate and subsidized
housing.198 As the New York Times reported, SF BARF members “can be
hard to label politically” given their combination of a pro-development
agenda and left political positions on most other issues.199 In some
respects members of SF BARF reflect internal tensions between two
generations of liberals: “a generally older group of progressives who
worry that an influx of corporate techies is turning a city that nurtured the
Beat Generation into a gilded resort for the rich . . . [and who] oppose
almost every new development except those reserved for subsidized
affordable housing.”200 Explaining why supply matters so much to YesIn-My-Backyard (YIMBY) advocates in the Bay Area like her, Trauss
noted, “We just flat out ran out of housing . . . . There’s not enough to go
around, and as with any kind of shortage if there’s not enough to go
around, rich people get what’s there.”201
I.

Possibility of a Collective Scholarly Push

Although theory is not the primary focus of this Article, the emerging
consensus that housing supply matters and that regulatory barriers
contribute to the affordable housing crisis presents an opportunity to
bridge competing strains of property theory. Whether dismissively labeled
as an “elite liberaltarian consensus”202 or categorized as an example of the
left finding some truth in things that the right has said for decades, joint
appreciation by conservatives and progressives of the impact zoning can
have on housing supply is exciting. It creates space to break through the
various barriers that until now have allowed local governments near
dynamic cities to severely limit the supply of new housing. Such barriers
are largely political and will be torn down through political movements
not legal theory. But an academic consensus, even or perhaps especially
d-climate-change-denial/ [https://perma.cc/643P-BDVQ] (listing similarities between supply skeptics
and those who deny climate change).
198. For more on the origins of SF BARF and on Sonja Trauss, see CONOR DOUGHERTY, GOLDEN
GATES: FIGHTING FOR HOUSING IN AMERICA 15–38 (2020).
199. Conor Dougherty, In Cramped and Costly Bay Area, Cries to Build, Baby, Build, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/business/economy/san-francisco-housing-tec
h-boom-sf-barf.html [https://perma.cc/R7MP-PUT9].
200. Id.
201. Katy Murphy, ‘Homes for Human Beings’: Millennial-Driven Anti-NIMBY Movement Is
Winning with a Simple Message, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 13, 2017, 3:10 AM), https://www.mercury
news.com/2017/11/12/homes-for-human-beings-millennial-driven-anti-nimby-movement-iswinning-with-a-simple-message/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2021).
202. Sitaraman et al., supra note 78, at 1810.
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an “elite” consensus, could serve as a lever to help unfreeze zoning and to
force zoning to account for state or regional, as opposed to purely local,
needs. Within the property theory space, such a consensus provides a way
for scholars to move beyond some of the trench warfare between
conservatives and progressives that has filled law review pages in the last
decade and that has left scholars talking past one another.
The emerging consensus, to the extent to which it facilitates scholarly
engagement with how people experience property or a lack thereof, may
have a theoretical payoff as well. The ongoing (polite) battle between
progressive and conservative property scholars over at least the last
decade has allowed academics to reconsider the very nature of property
and to question many of the high-level rules within the system.203 The
battle has also, for better or worse, sucked the air out of more pragmatic
and grounded scholarly explorations of property. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to rehash the opposing positions of conservatives and
progressive property folks,204 but those on both sides view their work as
important in improving how property rules operate in the real world.
There are some areas—the relative significance of the right to exclude and
the extent to which clear rules are fundamental to the system—where the
disagreements between conservative and progressive scholars is not likely
to shift much. But the emerging elite consensus that it is time to lessen the
extent to which land use regulations prevent housing development is an
area inviting a rapprochement in the form of a collective scholarly push.
Unaffordable housing has not been ignored by progressive antipoverty
advocates. They have been on the frontlines, supporting residents facing
displacement, eviction, and predatory practices by landlords.205 The same
is true of many professors and, as a consequence, law review pages are
filled with stories of fights against gentrification, public housing rules,

203. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917
(2010) (describing the battle between progressives and conservatives).
204. Partial summaries of these positions can be found in previous articles by the author, though it
is worth noting that information theory so far has tended to focus on broad understandings of property
and not on zoning. See Rosser, supra note 175, at 407–28 (providing a summary of information theory
and of responses to such work); Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of
Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 115–26 (2013) (providing a summary of the first batch
of progressive property works); see also Brandon M. Weiss, Progressive Property Theory and
Housing Justice Campaigns, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 251, 256–60 (2019) (providing a summary of
progressive property theory); Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 183 (2017) (providing an overview of conservative property thought and progressive
responses).
205. See, e.g., CITY LIFE VIDA URBANA, http://www.clvu.org [https://perma.cc/YE6J-EDJW] (a
Boston area organization fighting displacement); The All-In Cities Anti-Displacement Policy
Network, ALL-IN CITIES, https://allincities.org/where-we-work/anti-displacement-policy-network
[https://perma.cc/T9AC-FCH7] (a multi-city effort to fight displacement).
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rent increases, and poor housing conditions that are built around the
humanity of those impacted by unaffordable housing.206 For those in the
housing justice community, these fights transcend individual clients and
have systematic significance. And they are noble fights, grounded in a
way that is only possible when advocates get to know the poor and their
struggles. But such attention to individual struggles arguably leaves many
housing justice advocates either blind to the importance of supply or
without the time and resources to engage in broader policy pushes.
The difficulty balancing individual representation and advocacy for
systematic change is not unique to those operating in the housing space,
for similar critiques have long been leveled against direct legal services
for the poor. That these critiques are often penned by insiders seeking to
challenge the social-political system writ large, compelled to write out of
frustration or exhaustion with the endless parade of individual indignities,
is a sign that even those whose lives are dedicated to individual
representation recognize the limits of one-off fights.207 No wonder that
Matthew Desmond, at the end of both Evicted and in a recent op-ed on
evictions in the coronavirus pandemic, calls on Congress to meet the
challenges of eviction with massive rental assistance.208 For as much as
Evicted brought needed attention to the problem of eviction, in many ways
the poor do not have an eviction problem, they have a rent problem or a
rent-versus-income problem. Some evictions occur because landlords do
not want to deal with a tenant who complains about conditions or want to
renovate a unit to meet demand at the top of the market, but the main
driver is that tenants cannot afford to pay rent and fall behind. Their
household income cannot keep up with market rent even for run down
units and government programs do not provide funding to close the
income-rent gap for most low-income households. A similar story can be
told about many of the progressive housing fights over the past fifty years.
206. See, e.g., Yxta Maya Murray, The Takings Clause of Boyle Heights, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 109, 144–46 (2019) (discussing gentrification); Leah Goodridge & Helen Strom, Innocent
Until Proven Guilty?: Examining the Constitutionality of Public Housing Evictions Based on
Criminal Activity, 8 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 1–2 (2016) (writing about public housing
evictions); Allyson E. Gold, No Home for Justice: How Eviction Perpetuates Health Inequity Among
Low-Income and Minority Tenants, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 59, 73–74 (2016)
(highlighting eviction harms); Li, supra note 152 (discussing the problem of displacement associated
with gentrification).
207. See, e.g., Gary F. Smith, Poverty Warriors: A Historical Perspective on the Mission of Legal
Services, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 34 (2011) (critiquing the day-to-day work of legal aid lawyers as
not likely to lead to structural change); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE
L.J. 1049 (1970) (same).
208. DESMOND, supra note 122, at 308–13; Matthew Desmond, The Rent Eats First, Even During
a Pandemic, N.Y TIMES (Aug. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/29/opinion/sunday/cor
onavirus-evictions-superspreader.html [https://perma.cc/7A62-C2P6].
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As well-meaning as they are, they are attacks on the follow-on
consequences of low supply and low income, and as such amount to
rearguard actions that respond to market pressures but rarely drive market
outcomes.
If the challenge on the left is an inability to see the forest through the
trees, to take supply at least as seriously as the endless series of related
battles, the challenge on the right is recognizing that deregulation alone is
insufficient. Some people will not be housed without state support. And
an even larger number of people will remain severely rent burdened,
paying well beyond 30% of their income, if the United States does not
dramatically increase the breadth and depth of rental subsidies.209 Sudden
deregulation that made it much easier for developers to build more units
likely would have an effect across the market but getting additional supply
online takes time, as does downward filtering. Deregulation alone will not
be enough to house the most needy, because even with extremely
generous assumptions about the power of the market, it still depends on
ability to pay. Getting the poor housed will require increased public
investment in public housing, whether in the form of vouchers, traditional
public housing, shelters, housing first programs, public-private tax-credit
partnerships, or utility support. Though this Article focuses on the need to
lessen the impact of land use regulations on housing supply, marketoriented conservatives should be careful to not let their deregulatory
rhetoric take on an overly optimistic, panglossian air. When it comes to
increasing the housing supply, the state still matters and market alone will
not solve the problem, especially for those with the least ability to pay.
Increasing housing supply should be a priority for those committed to
the values of an ownership society as well as for those concerned about
increasing inequality and housing affordability. For such a collective push
to occur, progressive scholars might have to accept a bit of “I told you so”
ribbing from conservatives who have a longer track record of being
concerned about increasing supply through new construction. And for
their part, conservative scholars might have to demonstrate that they do in
fact care about the poor and vulnerable and were not using expressions of
concern as merely a rhetorical tool.
II.

THE EUCLID PROVISO
Though the first century of zoning was marked by deference to

209. For more on the definition of rent burden and the rise in rent burdened households, see PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AMERICAN FAMILIES FACE A GROWING RENT BURDEN (2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/04/rent-burden_report_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4L
8-RHDC].
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traditional exclusionary zoning, the seeds for a less insular understanding
of zoning were planted from the moment the Supreme Court first upheld
local zoning. Part II argues that the Euclid proviso—which limits local
authority if zoning is counter to the larger public interest—merits greater
attention from scholars and policymakers. Parochial local zoning
contributes to both geographic inequities and high housing costs. Part II
ends by showing that state preemption of local zoning not only is possible
but can further the general welfare.
A.

Local Zoning and the Larger Public Interest

In 1926, the Supreme Court held that zoning was a constitutionally
permitted use of the police power.210 Though the case required a second
oral argument and multiple briefs,211 the Court in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. adopted a highly deferential standard for judicial
review of municipal zoning.212 Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court,
declared that cities can put in place zoning restrictions unless they “are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”213 This loose standard
gave localities tremendous authority and a great deal of leeway to decide
for themselves what growth to permit and what forms of development to
block. But the Euclid opinion was not wholly blind to the dangers of
entrusting such unfettered discretion to local governments.
In what might be called the Euclid proviso, Sutherland noted that the
holding was not meant “to exclude the possibility of cases where the
general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the
municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the
way.”214 In the century that followed Euclid, there were only occasional
whispers heard from the proviso. Instead, cities flexed their muscles and
trumpeted their Supreme Court-affirmed zoning powers to exclude
undesirable uses and low-income people from their territory.215 But just

210. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
211. For an excellent history of Euclid, including a play-by-play of the strategies used by the
lawyers on both sides, see MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER
(2008). See also Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 597
(2001) (providing a history that emphasizes racial and economic exclusion as central to the case).
212. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395–97.
213. Id. at 395.
214. Id. at 390.
215. As Audrey McFarlane notes, “When the Supreme Court ratified zoning in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., it enshrined economic segregation and exclusion as a constitutional, if not
sensible, exercise of the police power.” McFarlane, supra note 8, at 1166; see also FISCHEL, supra
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as the Court observed that societal changes in the half-century preceding
Euclid changed the line on what is permissible for cities to regulate,216 so
too, circumstances have sufficiently changed since Euclid that it is once
again time to reevaluate the appropriate level of judicial deference when
it comes to local zoning regulations.
So far, the record is mixed when it comes to judicial checks on local
governance decisions that run counter to the larger public interest. In the
canonical zoning case, Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled that every “municipality must, by its land use regulations,
presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and
choice of housing.”217 The court held that cities “cannot foreclose the
opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate
income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that
opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality’s fair share of the
present and prospective regional need therefor.”218
In Mount Laurel II219, the judicially-imposed requirement on localities
was expanded to include an affirmative obligation to build low-income
housing. Tired of excuses and delays by municipalities, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that “[t]he municipal obligation to provide a realistic
opportunity for low and moderate income housing is not satisfied by a
good faith attempt. The housing opportunity provided must, in fact, be the
substantial equivalent of the fair share.”220 The court noted that it “may
require more than the elimination of unnecessary cost-producing
requirements and restrictions” for cities to meet their fair share
obligations; more demanding “[a]ffirmative governmental devices,”
including cooperation with federal housing subsidy programs, may be

note 138, at 171 (“Euclid’s victory cleared the way for zoning in almost all of the state courts, which
had been about evenly split on the constitutionality of zoning up to 1926.”). For a brief, well-written
history of zoning, see Christopher Serkin, A Case for Zoning, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 749, 754–70
(2020).
216. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387 (“Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied
to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even
half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations
are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify
traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would
have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for,
while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand
or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of
their operation.”).
217. Id. at 724.
218. Id.
219. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983).
220. Id. at 419.
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required.221 Unfortunately, the promising language in Mt. Laurel I and Mt.
Laurel II did not result in radical transformation in New Jersey. Localities
continued to drag their heels and to look for ways to avoid having to
provide housing for low-income (and often racially-defined or raciallystereotyped) people.222 More importantly, the Mt. Laurel approach, which
imposed affordable housing obligations on local zoning as part of cities’
obligations to the general welfare, did not escape the Garden State; it
remained a one-off that garnered attention but not followers.223
B.

Localized Inequities

Two zoning adjacent cases, Javins v. First National Realty Corp.224 and
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,225 help illuminate
how courts respond to locally-supported inequities. In Javins, Judge J.
Skelly Wright invented a novel doctrine, the implied warranty of
habitability (IWH), to deal with the poor conditions tenants faced in a
Washington, D.C. apartment building.226 Under the common law, tenants
had few protections against conditions that developed during the tenancy,
but, through the IWH, tenants could use poor conditions—lack of heat,
water damage, etc.—as a defense against eviction.227 Though the IWH has
been weakened over time,228 the Javins decision inspired localities across
the country to pass IWH statutes. What began with a single federal court
opinion swept the nation, fundamentally altering the landlord-tenant
relationship by significantly increasing (without compensation) the
obligations associated with residential rental ownership.229
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez—a case
involving a challenge to inequitable spending on public education in a

221. Id.
222. For an in-depth exploration of local resistance to the demands of the Mt. Laurel decisions, see
Joseph Marsico, Comment, A Forty-Year Failure: Why the New Jersey Supreme Court Should Take
Control of Mount Laurel Enforcement, 41 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149 (2016).
223. WOLF, supra note 211, at 143 (“While a few other states cautiously followed the Garden
State’s lead in the courts and legislative chambers—notably Pennsylvania, New York, California, and
Massachusetts—for the most part in those and the remaining states, local governments are given great
leeway in erecting zoning barriers to outsiders from the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder.”);
Boudreaux, supra note 28, at 631 (noting that “the rancor of the debate[ in New Jersey] has arguably
dissuaded other states from following a similar path”).
224. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
225. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
226. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077.
227. Id. at 1079–80.
228. See Super, supra note 177.
229. The only state without the IWH is Arkansas. Desmond & Bell, supra note 95, at 21.
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single school district that had a racially disparate impact230—shows the
promise as well as the downside of impact litigation meant to challenge
artificial boundaries. The Supreme Court acknowledged the inequities
involved in Texas’ system of local funding of education but rejected the
idea that education was a fundamental right under the Constitution.231 Not
only was San Antonio allowed to keep in place the structures that
advantaged schools and children in wealthy areas and disadvantaged
schools and children in poor areas, but the same was true across the
country.232
Although the Court demonstrated in Brown v. Board of Education233
that when it came to egregious forms of racial discrimination it could put
the general welfare above local educational policies,234 the San Antonio v.
Rodriguez Court was unwilling to consider wealth a suspect classification
nor intervene in local policies that create structural educational inequities
tied to wealth.235 While not a zoning case, the Supreme Court’s deference
to inequitable government policies in this case contributed to an arms race
across the nation, with wealthy areas using a combination of exclusionary
zoning and the strength of their now protected public schools to lock in
local advantage.236 The Javins decision shows how courthouse victories
can lead to legislative change protective of vulnerable groups. However,
the inverse is also true: after San Antonio v. Rodriguez extended localities
wide latitude in how they shape the costs and benefits of life within their
territories, local governments knew they could count on judicial deference
to shield their policies from meaningful challenges.
C.

The General Welfare

At least in theory, the Euclid proviso provides a way of responding to
parochial localism, providing policymakers with guidance as to when
states should intervene in local affairs. As Nestor Davidson argues in a
230. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
231. Id. at 18–37.
232. Camille Walsh, Erasing Race, Dismissing Class: San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 133, 167–69 (2011) (arguing that the San Antonio v.
Rodriguez holding limits the ability of advocates to challenge education inequities and highlighting
the continued economic and racial segregation in public education).
233. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
234. See id.
235. Walsh, supra note 232, at 170–71; Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It’s
All Just a Change in Attitudes, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 558–59 (1999).
236. See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 878 (2006) (faulting governance fragmentation for
both “fragmented school districts that institutionalize the racial segregation of students” and
exclusionary zoning).
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recent Article, when localities exercise state delegated powers, “that
plenary authority must advance the actual, general welfare of the people
of the state.”237 Consequently, “[t]his spatially inflected understanding of
general welfare thus supplies an operative principle to translate normative
commitments into the structural terms of state/local conflicts.”238 If
general welfare is indeed a limitation, then the structural question—
should something be done at the local or at the state level—can be
answered in part by looking at whether a locality is doing something that
offends state values. Davidson explains:
When local governments exercise their authority as a means of
racial, economic, or similar exclusion, their parochialism has an
inherently normative dimension. That exercise can offend the
values of the state as a whole and can therefore in turn justify state
intervention. Explicitly considering the general welfare of the
state in evaluating the boundaries of local power provides a
mechanism for limiting the most pernicious externalities that can
be produced by local parochialism at the margins.239
The challenge with Davidson’s use of the general welfare as a
limitation on local authority is that it assumes that “racial, economic, or
similar exclusion” runs counter to “the values of the state as a whole.”240
But what if the state also values such exclusion? This possibility is not
far-fetched; indeed, exclusion can be a normative commitment at both the
state and local level, which can be seen in state resistance to additional
supply of affordable housing in wealthy states such as California,
Connecticut, and New Jersey.
If “the general welfare” is going to limit localities, there has to be more
to “the general welfare” than simply moving up a political level and
allowing the state a carte blanche to supply the definition. Davidson
answers the problem of definitional source by turning to the Mount Laurel
I decision.241 “Looking to the concept of general welfare alone was not
sufficient to delineate the limits on local authority,” Davidson continues,
“rather, the court needed an underlying normative concern to give content
to the relevant terms of the broader welfare at issue.”242 The concern that
drove the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mount Laurel was the connection
between the fundamental human need for shelter and the general
237. Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954,
991 (2019).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 992.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 993–96.
242. Id. at 994.
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welfare.243 Taking a broad reading of what the New Jersey Supreme Court
was doing, Davidson argues that “the doctrine can be read as allowing
courts to distinguish between more or less normatively valid grounds for
the assertion of local autonomy in state/local conflicts.”244 This is an
attractive vision of courts to be sure, but one that relies heavily on
alignment between the progressive/academic vision of the general welfare
and that of courts for it to work.245 Put differently, what if judges have a
different understanding of what constitutes valid grounds for deferring or
not deferring to local autonomy? Ultimately, even though Davidson’s
article is only a partial step along the path towards “a coherent, textually
grounded, implementable conception of the outer boundaries of
localism,”246 it does a great job elevating the fact that there is “a normative
valence to localism”247 that cannot be avoided.
D.

State Preemption

Transitioning from theory to practice, the (limited) examples of state
interventions in local zoning provide a way of understanding the practical
reach of “general welfare” in the Euclid proviso. Though “state and
federal courts for the most part have ignored this Euclidian caveat,”248
states are beginning to be more assertive in adding content to the general
welfare. While select cities have made similar moves,249 in 2019, Oregon
became the first state to essentially prohibit SFH zoning in urban areas.250
Drawing on state level efforts to expand the default development rights of
owners and to require cities to permit higher density construction, John
243. Id.
244. Id. at 995.
245. To be fair, Davidson acknowledges and responds to this counterargument. See id. at 998–
1000.
246. Id. at 996.
247. Id. at 997.
248. WOLF, supra note 211, at 147; see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928) (ruling against a local zoning ordinance because the ordinance “d[id] not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare”).
249. In December 2018, for example, the Minneapolis City Council voted to upzone their entire
city to allow duplexes and triplexes on lots formerly limited to single family housing. For coverage
of the Minneapolis upzoning, see Richard D. Kahlenberg, How Minneapolis Ended Single-Family
Zoning, THE CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/report/minneapolis-endedsingle-family-zoning/ [https://perma.cc/3E7S-52WX]. See also The Editorial Board, Americans
Need More Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/opinion/
sunday/minneapolis-ends-single-family-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/NQV6-2552] (celebrating and
contextualizing the Minneapolis move).
250. See Jeff Andrews, Oregon Just Effectively Banned Single-Family Zoning, CURBED (July 1,
2019, 5:52 PM), https://archive.curbed.com/2019/7/1/20677502/oregon-yimby-single-family-zoning
-nimby-rent-control (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
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Infranca argues that states are engaged in a new form of statehouse-driven
zoning changes.251 Following Mount Laurel I, the first wave of state
efforts piggybacked on local zoning regulations by imposing additional
requirements but did not displace the local governance prerogative.252 The
emerging state zoning initiatives, in contrast, are less deferential and
impose states’ preferences for density and greater development directly
on localities—using state authority to knock down, rather than increase,
permitting process barriers.253
This new wave of statehouse zoning is best exemplified by the statelevel lowering of barriers homeowners face when they want to build and
rent out accessory dwelling units (ADUs).254 Though ADUs can take the
form of a new detached structure, they need not be separate from the main
house. The appeal of ADUs to housing advocates is simple: if
homeowners in areas zoned for SFHs had a right to build and rent out an
ADU on the land they already own, market forces would predictably result
in additional housing. The statutory allowances for ADUs vary and are
often flexible, allowing for everything from newly constructed standalone
backyard structures built onsite to tiny homes placed on driveways.255 In
some cases, providing homeowners with a right to rent out a separate unit
will not result in an additional unit of housing in the area, it will simply
convert an existing illegal rental arraignment into an officially sanctioned
one.256 Not every house will have an ADU, but for many homeowners, the
right to have an ADU will mean they can create space for an elderly
relative to live comfortably or can use the right to generate income from
tenants. The political appeal of ADU allowances crosses partisan lines in
part because it costs states little more than the effort to change the zoning
regulations. Though ADUs will not solve the supply problem by
251. John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a Housing Crisis, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 823 (2019).
252. Id. at 875–76.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 857–75. For extended discussion of ADUs, see John Infranca, Housing Changing
Households: Regulatory Changes for Micro-Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 53 (2014) [hereinafter Housing Changing Households]. See also Vicki Been, Benjamin
Gross & John Infranca, Responding to Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units
and Accessory Dwelling Units 26–29 (Jan. 2014) (unpublished working paper), https://furmancenter
.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_RespondingtoChangingHouseholds_2014_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V
GV-SWC7] (detailing the regulatory barriers that often limit ADU construction).
255. For overviews of city and state ADU regulations, including discussion of different approaches,
see Lisa T. Alexander, Community in Property: Lessons from Tiny Homes Villages, 104 Minn. L.
Rev. 385, 453–54 (2019); and Housing Changing Households, supra note 254, at 67–70.
256. Cities can, for example, run programs “that allow[] property owners to formally register and
rent” previously illegal units. Legalize Your Illegal Units Today, CITY OF S.F. DEP’T OF BLDG.
INSPECTION: KEY PROGRAMS, https://sfdbi.org/UnitLegalization [https://perma.cc/PNM7-W5MV].
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themselves, they can help.
State overrides of local zoning is not limited to the ADU context. As
an insightful article by Anika Lemar shows, state legislatures are willing
to use their authority to supersede local zoning limitations when there are
political or bureaucratic reasons for doing so.257 Lemar argues that
replacing local obstruction or barriers with more permissive state-level
regulation allows states to selectively displace local zoning that either
operates against state interests or the interests of lobbying groups which
can operate effectively at the state but not the local level.258 As Lemar
notes, “opponents of state interventions routinely complain that the state
seeks to encroach on local power. They never concede that the state is
simply reassuming authority that it originally granted to local
governments.”259 Lemar identifies family day care homes, manufactured
housing, small-scale alternative energy infrastructure, and group homes
as areas where a significant number of states have enacted legislation that
displaces local zoning.260 Two of these—manufactured housing and group
homes—are not unfamiliar to zoning scholars as examples of (limited)
national and state intervention.261 There is a long history of local
opposition to the siting of manufactured housing and group homes and of
interventions to tamper down such opposition.262 Family day care homes
and small-scale alternative energy infrastructure are relatively
underappreciated but likewise involve matters that can generate intense
hyper-local opposition even though they can be valuable for society at
large. Drawing on all four examples, Lemar argues that with the right
lobbying and pressure—originating from external interest groups or from
internal regulatory interests—states can and do displace local zoning rules
that are too parochial or that run counter to state regulatory interests.263

257. Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use Regulations, 97 N.C. L. REV.
293 (2019).
258. Id. at 297.
259. Id. at 305.
260. Id. at 305–44.
261. Daniel R. Mandelker, Zoning Barriers to Manufactured Housing, 48 URB. LAW. 233 (2016);
Tim Iglesias, Defining “Family” for Zoning: Contemporary Policy Challenges, Legal Limits and
Options, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. (Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), May 2014, at 1.
262. For more on local opposition to manufactured housing and state interventions in the name of
affordable housing, see Tim Iglesias, State and Local Regulation of Particular Types of Affordable
Housing, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 113, 116 (Tim Iglesias &
Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005).
263. Lemar, supra note 257, at 344–50.
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III. DEFENDING TRADITIONAL ZONING
Infranca and Lemar’s scholarship shows that concern for the general
welfare can lead states to displace local zoning limitations.264 But should
states go down that path? Should states further displace local zoning and
aggressively attack SFH zoning and other exclusionary forms of zoning
to increase the supply and affordability of housing? Part III addresses
these questions by considering the downsides of undermining traditional
zoning. Two recent articles answer this in the negative, arguing that it
would be a mistake to undermine respect and deference for local
zoning.265 A third looks at perhaps the most difficult issue when it comes
to state allowances that open up cities for additional development:
gentrification.266 While this third article ultimately comes down on the
pro-growth, anti-exclusionary side of the spectrum, it is worth closely
considering these three works. Together they show the danger of
overselling what zoning changes acting alone can accomplish and the
risks associated with state intervention in the zoning space.
A.

Valuing the Status Quo

In A Case for Zoning, Christopher Serkin defends traditional zoning by
arguing that it serves an important role “regulating the pace and costs of
community change . . . by maintaining community character, enhancing
property values, and allocating the costs of development between insiders
and outsiders.”267 Serkin begins his article by noting that “zoning is under
more sustained attack than at any time in the last seventy-five years” and
“[t]here is a growing call for a massive deregulatory project with respect
to zoning.”268 Serkin’s defense of zoning is a celebration of stability. As
Serkin and others observe, property law plays an important role in creating
and protecting stable expectations while also allowing for gradual
change.269 When someone buys a home, the purchase has both a physical
264. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that the Religious Land Use and
Institutional Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) can similarly work to displace local zoning. For more on
the RLUIPA, see John Infranca, Institutional Free Exercise and Religious Land Use, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1693 (2013).
265. Serkin, supra note 215; Richard C. Schragger, The Perils of Land Use Deregulation, 171
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3821094
[https://perma.cc/SM47-2JVU].
266. John Infranca, Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1271 (2020).
267. Serkin, supra note 215, at 752.
268. Id. at 750–51.
269. Stability and change are major themes, for example, in Hanoch Dagan’s recent theoretical
account of a utopian vision of property law in wealthy democracies. See HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL
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dimension (the lot, the walls, etc.) and a social one (the neighborhood, the
local school, etc.). Part of the purchase is “membership in a community
with a particular character.”270 Warning that the good schools that
attracted people “will degrade” if more people become part of the
community than the school system can handle, Serkin highlights that “one
of zoning’s central roles today is to protect consumer preferences by
preserving community character.”271 Zoning also protects property values
by preventing overly fluid movements of capital, limiting the extent to
which the wealthy are asked to subsidize the less wealthy.272 Traditional
zoning is “a regulatory barrier that helps to preserve the relative
homogeneity of the community,” and “benefits in-place property owners
at the expense of excluded outsiders.”273 When change does take place,
zoning restrictions help allocate the costs of growth, transferring wealth
“from newcomers to in-place property owners” directly, through
exactions, or indirectly, through regulatory burdens.274
Serkin’s argument becomes more speculative when he switches from
describing zoning abstractly to making predictive claims. Serkin observes
that zoning restrictions helped cities compete with suburbs and break free
from the urban growth machine-suburban exclusion binary.275 Cities
escaped the death spiral they were on in the 1970s and 1980s and once
more became attractive, in part, because they imposed exactions on
developers and limited housing supply.276 Within the city, local
“neighborhood-level control over land use, in particular, stabilized
communities and property values, making investments in urban real estate
appealing again.”277 If traditional local restrictions are undone, investors
might “rush for the exits” because of the resulting uncertainty associated
with urban ownership.278 Zoning protects cities from this sort of
instability.
Serkin’s second predictive claim is that if zoning protections were
THEORY OF PROPERTY (2021); see also Serkin, supra note 3, at 1055 (noting that “[f]or decades,
zoning created a relatively stable and predictable system defining development rights and also
neighbors’ expectations about what could be built nearby”); Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale,
110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 439–61 (2011) (discussing arguments grounded on stability and arguments
critiquing an overemphasis on stability).
270. Serkin, supra note 215, at 771.
271. Id. at 772, 775.
272. Id. at 777.
273. Id. at 778.
274. Id. at 782.
275. Id. at 786–93.
276. Id. at 792.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 793.
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lessened, local regulations would be replaced by private ordering that is
at least as restrictive.279 As Serkin warns, “[i]f local governments—and
particularly cities—cannot satisfy property owners’ desire for community
stability, then homeownership may increasingly retreat to private
suburban enclaves.”280 Collectively, buyers seem to want restrictions and
HOAs can serve as private substitutes for zoning.281 State-level efforts to
displace local exclusionary zoning could perversely lead to an increased
buyer preference for common interest communities even though these
“[p]rivate land use regulations in HOAs come with many of the same
problems as municipal zoning. They tend to impose even greater limits on
density, prohibit multifamily housing, and are geared specifically to keep
housing prices high.”282 Notably, Serkin’s second predictive argument is
not that exclusionary zoning is good, just that a rise in private ordering
should zoning restrictions be lifted would be worse.283
A Case for Zoning’s conclusion is worth quoting in its entirety:
Zoning’s future is in doubt. Its original justifications appear weak
and insufficient to defend current practices against a growing
affordability crisis. But there are other justifications for zoning
beyond simply separating incompatible uses of land. Zoning is
better seen as a tool for moderating the pace of community change
and, in so doing, allocating costs between insiders and outsiders.
These are more complex goals that require a more nuanced
assessment of the competing pressures of stability and dynamism
in our communities. Zoning no doubt has an ugly history, but
when evaluated and utilized correctly, it could have a beautiful
future.284
What is notable about this conclusion is how tentative it is. Indeed, one
could agree with Serkin’s entire article—the history of zoning it gives, its
account of what zoning does, and the possible negative consequences of
deregulatory moves—and write a very similar conclusion to an article
favoring state intervention. As Serkin explains, “Ultimately, zoning
represents a tradeoff between stability and dynamism. Stability generally
favors the interests of in-place property owners, dynamism the interests

279. Id. at 793–98.
280. Id. at 794.
281. Id. at 794–96.
282. Id. at 797.
283. Id. at 798. But see Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227,
1293 (2006) (noting that exclusionary zoning and restrictive covenants are not perfect substitutes
because “it is nearly impossible to accomplish private land use control in areas that are already built
up”).
284. Serkin, supra note 215, at 798.

Rosser (Do Not Delete)

864

10/19/21 1:43 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:811

of outsiders seeking entry.”285 Serkin provides a strong argument in favor
of the status quo, or at least of accounting for the costs of change, but in
doing so also lays out the reasons why scholars and policymakers might
reach opposite conclusions.286 As Wendell Pritchett and Shitong Qiao
observe, “Property owners do have a legitimate claim to preserving their
particular living styles and values through land use controls. But such
controls should be evaluated in a larger social context, beyond property
owners’ interests and values.”287
B.

Protecting Localism

The second article, The Perils of Land Use Deregulation, offers a
different criticism of state intervention in local zoning. Richard C.
Schragger argues that displacing local exclusionary zoning with statelevel zoning is a mistake because it will hurt the less well-off.288 If
Serkin’s article makes a lukewarm case for zoning, The Perils of Land
Use Deregulation turns on the heat. Schragger argues that state-level
zoning will weaken the ability of cities to enact progressive policies that
help low-income communities, especially low-income communities of
color.289 Moreover, he cautions that the zoning changes done through
state-level preemption of local governments will be those supported by
powerful elites for purely self-interested reasons.290 The article is
informed by a healthy skepticism of trickle-down economics and of the
recent rhetorical embrace of zoning deregulation.291
Schragger’s article begins in much the same way as Serkin’s does, with
an acknowledgment of the harms of exclusionary zoning.292 Although
zoning is often characterized as a limitation on development, Schragger
argues that exclusionary zoning itself reflects a pro-development

285. Id. at 784. It is important to not overstate the value of stability: “Any defensible conception of
stability must accommodate the federal mandate to make figurative and literal room for an
increasingly diverse America.” Shayak Sarkar & Josh Rosenthal, Exclusionary Taxation, 53 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 626 (2018) (discussing tax policies that operate similarly to exclusionary
zoning in favoring existing property owners over in-movers).
286. After describing the ways the law protects homeowners against change, Kenneth Stahl, for
example, concludes “that municipalities’ charge to protect homeowners’ reliance interests is a selfdefeating enterprise, and unworthy of the judicial deference it has been granted.” Kenneth A. Stahl,
Reliance in Land Use Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 949, 956.
287. Pritchett & Qiao, supra note 41, at 485.
288. Schragger, supra note 265.
289. Id. at 56–67.
290. Id. at 26.
291. Id. at 32–39.
292. Id. at 8–14.
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impulse.293 Using the quintessential affordable housing and zoning case
to illustrate the point, Schragger writes, “when Mount Laurel was decided,
the problem was not that there was too little housing being built, but rather
that there was too much—of a certain kind.”294 He continues, “the
numerous Mount Laurels of the 1970s were a ‘successful’ response to the
post-war housing shortage across the United States, just not for those
worst off, and generally not for Blacks or other minorities.”295 Setting up
zoning in this way allows Schragger to make a bigger claim, namely that
“land use reform—whether zoning or anti-zoning—is driven by demand
and generally accompanies economic growth . . . . [B]oth zoning and antizoning are creatures of the ‘market’—not departures from or exceptions
to it.”296 It is this equivalence that drives Schragger’s analysis and
conclusions.297
If exclusionary zoning and anti-zoning are essentially the same—tools
for the better-off to get what they want—then the supposed benefits in
terms of housing affordability of state-level displacement of local zoning
might be illusory. Schragger attributes the rise in anti-zoning sentiment to
three factors: increasing attention to racial disparities, especially those
impacting the fortunes of African-Americans;298 “the spatial determinants
of inequality”;299 and the ways in which zoning restrictions can harm
overall economic output by making high-growth cities prohibitively
expensive for in-migration.300 Certainly, the phenomenal work of Richard
Rothstein,301 Raj Chetty,302 and others303 is helping drive the conversation
around zoning, but as Schragger notes, these academic reasons are
“ultimately being given political momentum by housing need.”304
With the middle class priced out of cost of housing in high growth
cities, anti-zoning has become a bipartisan rallying cry: “Eliminating
293. Id. at 10.
294. Id. at 13.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 14.
297. See also id. at 62–63 (“[W]hile the growth machine and the homevoter appear to represent
contrasting political economies roughly corresponding to ‘growth’ and ‘no-growth,’ they are both
concerned with protecting and maximizing land-based wealth.”).
298. Id. at 16.
299. Id. at 17.
300. Id. at 18–20.
301. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
302. See supra note 19 (referencing Chetty’s work).
303. See Schleicher, supra note 134, at 96–104 (discussing and citing the literature on
agglomeration economics).
304. Schragger, supra note 265, at 19.
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development barriers fits into a political space that can be increasingly
occupied by both the political left and the right: removal of barriers to
entry, increasing opportunity, and freeing the market for development.”305
Schragger is skeptical about this political alliance, arguing that it will be
captured by those same market forces that in earlier periods benefited
from exclusionary zoning.306 As Schragger highlights, even if anti-zoning
advocates succeed in expanding state preemption of local zoning
regulation limiting new housing construction, it will “not effectively
address the problems of the lower half of the housing market.”307 And to
the degree to which it succeeds, it will exacerbate the split between
surging metropolitan areas and struggling areas.308
At its core, Schragger’s defense of traditional localism in zoning is
based on a belief that local solutions are likely to work out better for the
disempowered. Not only is there no reason to think states are more
supportive of the poor,309 but state preemption in the zoning space could
also weaken cities generally, allowing states more space to block
progressive moves by cities in other spheres.310 Schragger argues that
deference to local zoning permits cities to extract value from developers
and mobile capital—in the form of fees as well as labor concessions—that
benefit the local community.311 Moreover, “embrace of growth will likely
reproduce existing metropolitan-area inequalities,” according to
Schragger, with suburb decline no better than previous urban decline and
labor stuck chasing mobile capital across the country.312 Rather than this
dystopia, Schragger offers up municipal living wage efforts to argue that
“city power is a necessary predicate for the success of urban economic
equality movements.”313
305. Id. at 20.
306. See also JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992) (presenting a theory of
property rights evolution that emphasizes how elites set up rules that benefit themselves rather than
setting up rules based on efficiency or other values). The downside of this argument is that it proves
too much. If elites have captured local zoning and elites would capture state-level zoning, the capture
explanation of legal power does little to answer whether states should or should not preempt local
zoning. It merely suggests that some of the same problems will exist regardless of which level of
government is engaged in zoning.
307. Schragger, supra note 265, at 32.
308. Id. at 35–40.
309. Id. at 22–26; see also Richard C. Schragger, The Political Economy of City Power, 44
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 114 (2017) (making a similar point about regional governance proposals).
310. Schragger, supra note 265, at 30 (“[T]he denigration and dilution of the principle of local
autonomy will further expose the city to hostile state control across a range of policies—many of
which would otherwise be redistributive.”).
311. Id. at 56–60.
312. Id. at 63.
313. Id. at 65.
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Contextualizing the Case for Traditional Zoning

The arguments made by Serkin and Schragger in defense of traditional
zoning and against state zoning are powerful and should not be treated
dismissively. They show that any YIMBY projections suggesting that
increasing supply alone will solve housing affordability are overly
optimistic. A substantial increase in housing assistance is required if any
zoning approach is to reach those in the lower economic classes.314 They
also exemplify the law of unintended consequences: state displacement of
local zoning could lead the wealthy to rely even more on restrictive
covenant protections against density and could weaken cities generally.
On the other hand, both Serkin and Schragger are largely engaged in a
defense of the status quo. They might want localities to do more to help
the poor when it comes to land use, but after a century of deference to
local authority, that hope seems unwarranted absent state intervention. So,
while Schragger refers to the anti-zoning position as the “emerging
conventional wisdom,”315 it is fair to ask if emerging conventional
wisdom is even a thing. Similarly, Serkin writes that a consensus against
zoning is “building . . . among academics and elite activists,”316 but
examples of states reclaiming zoning authority or sharply curtailing local
zoning choices remain the exception.317 Both the law and conventional
wisdom still strongly support deference to local governments on zoning.
Put differently, Serkin and Schragger are out in front of a threat to local
zoning that is only starting to take shape.
Traditional zoning hardly needs champions rising in its defense. As
Schragger notes, concerns about exclusionary zoning have been around
since the 1920s, with little success in resisting its power.318 It is only
because cities have become so unaffordable that such arguments are
gaining traction.319 But rather than seeing a moment of interest
convergence as an infrequent opportunity that should be taken advantage

314. For an argument that public funding for low-income housing should increase, see CAMPAIGN
FOR HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. FUNDING, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE CASE FOR INCREASED FEDERAL

INVESTMENTS IN AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2017), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/A-Place-ToCall-Home.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NCU-2Y9B].
315. Schragger, supra note 265, at 3.
316. Serkin, supra note 215, at 751.
317. See supra notes 248–264 and accompanying text.
318. Schragger, supra note 265, at 14; see also Note, supra note 127, at 1128 (“Planners,
policymakers, and legal commentators have struggled for decades to find solutions to the problem of
exclusionary zoning.”).
319. Schragger, supra note 265, at 2.
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of,320 Schragger imagines this moment as more powerful than it is,
threatening to undermine cities generally.321 Left unaddressed is the
possibility of making a change in one area with a long history of racism
and exclusion—local zoning—without necessarily sliding down the
slippery slope in other areas where cities traditionally enjoy an
expectation of home rule.322 Enlightened city governments could learn
from the past and make piecemeal changes, cracking open their
communities to those currently excluded, but often “a single, sweeping
edit to these maps may be politically easier than block-by-block
tweaking.”323 The state option is worth pursuing.
Peeling away local zoning barriers will not solve the housing
affordability crisis. Even in the absence of those additional expenses
associated with zoning restrictions, the market cannot produce new units
at a price point that families lower on the socio-economic spectrum can
afford without being subsidized. Affordable housing for all requires a
commitment to fully housing the population that this country has never
shown.324 But the fact that zoning deregulation will not magically result
in full housing for all is hardly a reason to reject deregulatory moves. It is
not a case of this (affordable housing) or that (dezoning), but rather of this
and that.325 Both should be pushed. It is true that in this moment, perhaps
because academics sense the possibilities raised by interest convergence,
320. See GLAESER, supra note 118 (“Reforming local land use controls is one of those rare areas
in which the libertarian and the progressive agree. The current system restricts the freedom of the
property owner, and also makes life harder for poorer Americans. The politics of zoning reform may
be hard, but our land use regulations are badly in need of rethinking.”).
321. See Schragger, supra note 265, at 68.
322. The idea of “home rule” is that cities are the proper site of governance affecting the city and
that states should defer to cities rather than preempt them. For a history and defense of home rule, see
CTR. FOR CITY SOLS., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(2020), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Home-Rule-Principles-ReportWEB-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/55NX-VUZ7].
323. Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Start to Question an American Ideal: A House with a
Yard on Every Lot, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/18/u
pshot/cities-across-america-question-single-family-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/92GN-BF9B].
324. As Andrea Boyack observes, “[t]he federal government could very quickly at least double or
triple its investment in affordable housing solutions merely by reallocating resources from one
category of housing expenditures, namely, those benefiting wealthy homeowners that do not improve
housing affordability, to expenditures that do address housing cost burdens.” See Boyack, supra note
87, at 1243; see also Lance Freeman, America’s Affordable Housing Crisis: A Contract Unfulfilled,
92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 709, 711 (2002) (“Seriously addressing the issue of affordability would
require a major expansion of resources devoted to affordable housing. Some estimates suggest HUD’s
budget would have to be doubled. The most equitable policy would be to treat affordable housing as
an entitlement, rather than rationing it on a first come, first served basis as is done today.”).
325. Tellingly, Serkin observes elsewhere, “Odd political alliances dot the landscape of local land
use disputes, with—for example—affordable housing advocates working alongside for-profit
developers to resist restrictive zoning ordinances.” Serkin, supra note 3, at 1060.
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more space is being dedicated to fight against traditional exclusionary
zoning.326 This Article is a good example of that. But that does not mean
that affordable housing is unimportant nor that advocates for zoning
deregulation do not realize that many housing problems cannot be solved
through deregulation alone. Put differently, the need for additional
housing subsidies to reach the poor should be acknowledged by both sides
in any debate over zoning deregulation.327 That being said, the imperative
of expanding such subsidies should not be accepted as a rhetorical device
to protect traditional exclusionary zoning. Treating the need for affordable
housing in such a way is akin to the move by law and economics scholars
to use the possibility of tax-and-transfer solutions as an overly convenient
trump card to block meaningful consideration of other policy changes that
have redistributive consequences.328
D.

Gentrification and Development

The strongest argument against using state authority to increase
allowable density in order to increase the supply of housing is that it will
lead to gentrification. In Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies, John
Infranca takes on the question of gentrification directly, ultimately
concluding that there is a “modest case” for treating opposition to new
development in lower income urban neighborhoods differently than
opposition to new development in wealthier communities.329 But he is
quick to add that “any preferential treatment [with regards to development
opposition in poorer neighborhoods] must avoid undermining broader
efforts towards reducing regulatory and procedural obstacles to denser
development and increased housing supply.”330 Infranca allows that such
a preference may be appropriate “to address concerns about unwanted
changes to neighborhood character and the claims of long-term residents
to a distinct stake in the neighborhood that merits deference and perhaps
326. For a theoretical elaboration of regional interest convergence arguing that such convergence
can be a tool for helping the poor across a region, see Patience A. Crowder, (Sub)Urban Poverty and
Regional Interest Convergence, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 763 (2014).
327. Indeed, they are intimately linked, with opponents of affordable housing projects often using
zoning tools as the mechanism to defeat otherwise viable proposals. See Jacqueline Rabe Thomas,
Separated by Design: How Some of America’s Richest Towns Fight Affordable Housing, CONN.
MIRROR (May 22, 2019), https://ctmirror.org/2019/05/22/separated-by-design-how-some-of-americ
as-richest-towns-fight-affordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/LNX9-WHLA] (providing an in-depth
exploration of exclusionary practices in southern Connecticut).
328. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016) (discussing and critiquing this tax-and-transfer line of
law and economics arguments).
329. Infranca, supra note 266, at 1297–1301.
330. Id. at 1278.
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some share of the increased property values generated by a zoning
change.”331 But Infranca is quick to add, “[o]ther local concerns, most
notably concerns regarding displacement and rent increases, do not justify
special treatment in the form of greater local control.”332 A preference
might be appropriate, in other words, but Infranca does not imagine a very
strong preference.
As Infranca highlights, residents in poorer neighborhoods slated for
new development often fear displacement and changes to the
neighborhood’s character.333 Yet, fear of displacement as a result of new
development “is largely unmerited,” Infranca argues, adding that
“opposition to new development is likely to only exacerbate displacement
and rising housing costs.”334 In his review of the literature on
gentrification, Infranca highlights studies finding that “during a period of
rapid gentrification, lower income children living in gentrifying
neighborhoods—including only those children living in market-rate
housing—were not more likely to move than similar children in nongentrifying neighborhoods.”335
The question still remains whether gentrification is spurred along by
new development. Empirical evidence does not support this, and research
finds that “neighborhoods where new housing is built have less
displacement than those without new development.”336 These findings
seem to run counter to people’s lived experiences of seeing rents increase
following new construction in a gentrifying neighborhood, and counter to
the supply-side understanding of gentrification held by “[m]ost in the
housing advocacy community.”337 But if gentrification is taken as a given,
it is easy to see how increased supply generally can lessen
displacement.338 Exclusionary practices—zoning limitations on new
development and on density—push up the rental rate for existing units in
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1284.
334. Id. at 1287.
335. Id. at 1290–91.
336. Id. at 1292; see also Boudreaux, supra note 28, at 638 (“[I]f the law allows for construction
of appealing new market-rate housing. California data show that new construction correlates with less
displacement of existing residents.” (emphasis in original)).
337. Mangin, supra note 119, at 108.
338. As John Mangin explains,
[i]f a high-demand, high-cost neighborhood won’t build, developers and people looking for
housing will be diverted to the nearest low-cost neighborhoods. That increases demand and
development and leads to gentrification. (Don’t blame in-movers or developers for
gentrification—they’d rather be in the high-cost neighborhoods. Blame the exclusionary
practices of people in the high-cost neighborhoods.)
Id. at 95.
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an area experiencing heightened demand.339 More permissive zoning
“might slow, not accelerate, the phenomenon of gentrification” because
allowing new construction on a broad scale will provide an outlet for
demand that otherwise competes with the residential interests of the preexisting community.340
Though Infranca rejects displacement as a justification for
differentiating exclusionary tendencies in poor communities from
exclusionary impulses in wealthy areas, he concludes that concerns about
changes to community character can support the idea that “lower income
communities should be granted a greater degree of local control.”341
Additional local control or mechanisms for the community to capture
“some share of the value of new development . . . might be justified as a
partial remedy for the historical treatment of these communities.”342 As
Infranca observes, calls for additional control, “when voiced by
communities long denied such control, possess distinct salience.”343 Local
control as a way to protect community character can help protect
resident’s neighborhood-tied personhood interests,344 but even these
“grants of local control must consider the common good (or general
welfare), which, in this context, is the provision of an adequate supply of
relatively affordable housing at the municipal or regional level.”345
Though Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies is attentive to the
harms of gentrification, it never loses sight of increasing the supply of
affordable housing as primary public good. Accordingly, elevating the
participatory rights for poor communities is rejected346 and only in
“extremely limited cases” should localities be able to restrict density.347
Building on the work of others,348 the article suggests that some form of

339. Boudreaux, supra note 28, at 619 (“It is a simple microeconomic formula: legal restraints on
the supply of housing combine with greater demand to increase rental costs.”).
340. Id. at 653. “Moreover,” Infranca notes, “the positive benefits of gentrification for existing
residents—including reduced exposure to neighborhood poverty, improved amenities, and increases
in property values for homeowners—may outweigh any negative effects.” Infranca, supra note 266,
at 1293.
341. Infranca, supra note 266, at 1296.
342. Id. at 1300.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1305.
345. Id. at 1314.
346. Id. at 1314–17; see also Anika Singh Lemar, Overparticipation: Designing Effective Land
Use Public Processes, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (detailing problems with public
participation in land use matters).
347. Infranca, supra note 266, at 1319.
348. See id. at 1319–27 (discussing the work of David Schleicher, Rachel Godsil, Emily Hamilton,
Salim Furth, Lance Freeman, Chris Elmendorf, Darien Shanske, Vicki Been, and Rick Hills).
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transferable development right (TDR) given to those in areas that might
experience gentrification could help ameliorate, or at least counterbalance, some of the political opposition to upzoning.349 A hot topic in
property theory, TDRs and other methods of separating property rights
into use, investment, and other distinct rights are attractive in part because
such division of interests offers a way to recognize the rights of tenants,
not just owners, when it comes to distributing the gains associated with
new construction.350 Resident-tied TDRs, however, remain more thought
experiments than real at this point.351 Infranca’s overall conclusion is that
even lower-income communities should not have “the power to exclude
or control new development” because “exercise of such power is likely to
prove detrimental not only to the community itself, but also to the broader
cause of adding much needed new housing to the benefit of those outside
the community as well.”352 Increasing the supply of housing must be
prioritized over even well-meaning efforts to prevent new development.
Acknowledging the limits of what we know about gentrification is
essential to understanding its relationship to large-scale zoning changes
designed to expand the supply of housing. The gentrification that lowerincome urban areas currently experience, even if it takes the form of
additional development in those areas, is a consequence primarily of
exclusionary policies and not of permissive zoning. This is a crucial point
and worth pausing on. Meaningful state displacement of traditional zoning
and state-led deregulatory moves would be experienced over the entire
metropolitan region. Gentrification’s stereotypical sequence—wealthier
and whiter residents moving into an area that previously had lower
economic resources and a larger less white population followed by
displacement of some original residents—is partly a consequence of
demand pressure that cannot be satisfied elsewhere in the metropolitan
region because of exclusionary limits on new construction. Although at a
349. Id. at 1323.
350. Lee Fennell, in particular, has been at the forefront in pushing for and discussing the
possibilities associated with splitting traditional ownership interests into smaller bites that serve
different purposes. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND AGGREGATION IN
LAW AND LIFE (2019); LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND
PROPERTY LINES (2009); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Auctioning the
Upzone, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 513 (2020) (exploring a particularized way of severing
development rights).
351. For a comprehensive exploration of the possibility of TDRs to overcome local opposition to
increased development, see Hills Jr. & Schleicher, supra note 40. See also VICKI BEEN, JOHN
INFRANCA, JOSIAH MADAR & JESSICA YAGER, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL EST. & URB. POL’Y,
UNLOCKING THE RIGHT TO BUILD: DESIGNING A MORE FLEXIBLE SYSTEM FOR TRANSFERRING
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (2014), https://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter_UnlockingtheRighttoB
uild.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW3Q-TH6U].
352. Infranca, supra note 266, at 1327.
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micro level gentrification seems to follow on the heels of new
construction, removing zoning barriers in a more comprehensive way
could lessen the depth and power of gentrification in any particular
neighborhood.
Washington, D.C., which has undergone extensive gentrification over
the last two decades, provides a good example of how broad growth
allowances could reduce gentrification pressures. The city allowed greater
density along the metro’s green line, from Shaw to U Street to Columbia
Heights, and, consequently, new apartment building and businesses that
catered to yuppies sprung up in that same area.353 But the gentrification in
a transitional part of D.C. cannot be separated from the linked decision to
keep in place exclusionary SFH zoning rules in wealthier areas such as
Spring Valley and Chevy Chase. Switching from a policy of
neighborhood-by-neighborhood adjustments of what is allowed
(adjustments that encourage development in lower income areas while
protecting wealthy areas) to a more comprehensive allowance would
lessen demand intensity in transitional areas.354 Whether this allowance
applies generally to the entire region or makes distinctions based on public
transportation infrastructure or proximity to zones that already allow
apartments, systematic upzoning can protect low-income communities of
color from rapid, concentrated gentrification by opening up space
citywide for investment in additional housing. This can protect lowincome communities of color from the sort of rapid gentrification in one
area that can happen when exclusionary zoning blocks new housing in the
rest of the city.
The conclusion that even subordinated local communities, areas
marked by disadvantages tied to race, class, and their intersection, should
not be empowered to block regional or state-level measures designed to
increase residential density can be hard to swallow. Such communities
have well-founded reasons to be skeptical about market-oriented
solutions,355 and it seems unfair to deny them the use of exclusionary tools
long enjoyed by the white suburban middle class just when the city is
making a comeback after having passed through a long period of neglect.
But the lens needs to widen to include not only current residents but also

353. See Kate Rabinowitz, A Decade of Demographic Change in D.C.: Which Neighborhoods
Have Changed the Most?, D.C. POL’Y CTR.: DATALENSDC (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.dcpolicyce
nter.org/publications/demographic-change-d-c-neighborhoods/ [https://perma.cc/3372-BYV4].
354. Lee Fennell makes a similar argument about racial integration and gentrifying neighborhoods,
observing, “[i]f more neighborhoods were stably integrated, property value increases and
demographic changes would likely occur more evenly and organically across a larger set of
neighborhoods.” Fennell, supra note 56, at 372.
355. See Schragger, supra note 265, at 4.
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would be in-movers locked out of the community because of traditional
exclusionary zoning. Those kept out of growing urban areas will often be
members of the same racial groups and low-income community as those
potentially harmed by gentrification, but they are differently situated.
Given that empirical studies suggest that new residential construction
does not necessarily lead to displacement,356 scholars can appropriately
move from focusing primarily on the ways gentrification harms a
geographically-defined subset of the poor experience to the ways in which
failure to increase the housing supply harms the poor generally. While
existing residents may have a slightly greater claim to space in a city than
in-movers (a debatable proposition but one that is often assumed without
justification), it is both shortsighted and inequitable to focus only on the
harms associated with growth. Those concerned about gentrification
should also have to reckon with the needs of those people, often
subordinated along race and class lines, unable to move into the
community because of the exclusionary impact of deferring to local
preferences that limit growth.357
Ultimately, affordable housing must be front-and-center in any
discussion of whether to stick with or move away from traditional zoning.
Since zoning restrictions and deference to local zoning traditionally have
been used to exclude others and limit entrance, it is time to consider
alternatives that put fewer barriers in front of the housing sector and take
a wider perspective on what the general welfare means when it comes to
zoning.
IV. REVISITING THE EUCLID PROVISO
Societal changes—the increasing attractiveness of the urban core to
well-heeled younger adults and bipartisan awareness that too many people
find themselves priced out of decent housing—have weakened local
zoning’s stranglehold on politics and development. Thriving metropolitan
areas are at an inflection point: it is possible for the well-off to imagine
living comfortably and raising children in either the city or the suburb.
Strong economic growth in the privileged regions of the country supports
this delicate balance, but the relationship between these high growth cities
and their suburbs is inherently precarious. Many suburbs now face the real
or perceived danger of a lower tax base coupled with increased demand

356. See supra footnotes 190–196 and accompanying text.
357. See also Boyack, supra note 4, at 477–82 (highlighting the costs of collective exclusion
accomplished through zoning and NIMBY-ism).
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for public services that once plagued central cities.358 The shared
solution—the de facto policy at all levels—is to limit new residential
construction. Antipathy to apartments pre-dates zoning,359 and continues
into the present. With SFH zones largely untouchable360 and severe
restrictions on the places where density and height are allowed,361 entire
regions are trying to seal themselves off from the poor and lower-middle
class.
This inflection point presents a window of opportunity to broaden the
scale of zoning away from local dominance. But it could be only a brief
window. As cities transition from embracing in-movers to excluding—
taking on either an antagonistic relationship with the suburbs or acting in
concert with a few privileged suburbs to create a bubble of exclusion—
their interests and the interests of the elite they seek to attract will likely
coalesce around exclusion. Though others have noted similar changes—
the rise of exclusionary zones around entire superstar cities and their
suburbs—in the lived environment, the takeaways so far have been largely
academic, which is to say overly determined and pessimistic. Although it
may be dismissed as a utopian fantasy, using this inflection point as an
opportunity for state-level zoning interventions provides a way to ensure
that the general welfare, which is supposed to govern the imposition of
zoning restrictions, takes into account those lower on the socio-economic
scale.
Before defending state preemption of local zoning, it is worth
acknowledging that there is nothing new to the idea that traditional local
zoning is exclusionary and the law should transition to state or regional
approaches.362 As a 1971 article notes, the fact that zoning is a delegated
form of the police power makes it “logical to turn to the state” as a way to
remedy exclusionary zoning.363 Scholars have urged zoning
regionalization for decades. Faced with endless local obstructionism and
deliberate exclusionary practices, it seems intuitive that corrective
358. See, e.g., Crowder, supra note 326, at 775 (“[T]he exodus to the exurbs resulted in
disinvestment in the inner-ring suburbs similar to that experienced by the central cities decades
earlier.”).
359. See Maureen E. Brady, Turning Neighbors into Nuisances, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1609 (2021).
360. See Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing, supra note 158, at 11; Ellickson, The Zoning
Strait-Jacket, supra note 158.
361. See Boudreaux, supra note 28, at 626 (observing that “tall apartment buildings are forbidden
throughout many American metropolitan areas—in cities as well [as in] suburbs”).
362. Arguably, the most important expression of the idea that states should reclaim land use
authority is nearly half a century old. See FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971).
363. Paul Davidoff & Neil Newton Gold, Exclusionary Zoning, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION
56, 62 (1970).
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“policies should be statewide, or at least regional, in scope.”364 Yet,
despite such extensive scholarship, deference to local zoning remains the
norm.365 The predicted quiet revolution that was expected to sweep in an
era of state-level land use planning “failed to materialize.”366
There are several reasons, however, to think that now is an opportune
time to push. First, the housing affordability crisis is reaching an everwidening segment of the population. What previously could be dismissed
as a problem affecting only the poor is being felt in some cities by even
the upper middle class. Second, exclusion and anti-development have
been so successful that they inspired the YIMBY counter-movement.367
YIMBYism is but the highest profile example of the shifting politics
surrounding density. Third, cracks in the localism’s monopoly have
appeared. States are using their authority to grant property owners
additional development rights that in practice will increase density within
areas zoned locally for single family homes. Finally, in zoning, as in
property law in general, “[e]ven first principles are up for grabs.”368 The
current contested status of zoning, driven by the affordability crisis, makes
it important to consider ways in which traditional exclusionary zoning
might be effectively undercut even though arguments for a regional or
state approach to zoning might ordinarily seem a bit stale.
Academics and policymakers should join in the fight against local
dominance of zoning. It is tempting for academics to see the many
roadblocks faced by this and other revisionary zoning proposals and
simply proclaim that nothing can be done, that local zoning is politically

364. Orfield, supra note 236, at 879; see also Note, supra note 127, at 1128 (“Because local control
of land-use planning leads naturally to exclusionary ordinances that harm the region as a whole, state
or regional override of local zoning decisions is a logical solution to the problem of exclusionary
zoning.”).
365. See, e.g., WOLF, supra note 211, at 149 (“[D]espite a great deal of rhetoric and numerous
supporting studies over the last few decades, there have been no significant steps taken toward
effective and widespread regional planning and governance.”). But see Gerald E. Frug, Rick T. Su &
David J. Barron, Let Towns Have More Power and Regional Planning May Follow,
COMMONWEALTH MAG. (Jan. 1, 2004), https://commonwealthmagazine.org/politics/let-towns-havemore-power-and-regional-planning-may-follow/ [https://perma.cc/EXJ3-AM58] (arguing that state
limitations on local power (not local power itself) are to blame for local resistance to change and
efforts to preserve the status quo); David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of
the Field from the Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261 (2005) (same); David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2257 (2003) (arguing that if local authority were expanded, cities could do more
to address issues such as sprawl and exclusion).
366. Bronin, supra note 13, at 232.
367. For more on the rise of YIMBYism, see Kenneth A. Stahl, “Yes in My Backyard”: Can a New
Pro-Housing Movement Overcome the Power of NIMBYs?, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. (Thomson
Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), March 2018, at 1.
368. Serkin, supra note 3, at 1056.
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untouchable, “as a way of life . . . almost impervious to legal remedy.”369
There is a whole literature on regionalism informed by this sort of
pessimism. Even scholars who think local dominance of zoning is a bad
thing seem resigned to it and dismiss contrary proposals as utopian.370
Such views are informed by at least a half century of advocates
continually butting their heads against the local nature of zoning and, as
such, this negative take has some justifiable confidence behind it.
Regional approaches undermine the interests homeowners have in
exclusion and often will be “wildly unpopular.”371 But just because
something is hard and the end is not fully defined does not mean there is
no value in staking out a direction for long-term change.
Every proposal is subject to linked critiques, either that it is so narrow
as to be inconsequential or it is too ambitious and thus utopian, but as
Roberto Mangabeira Unger argues, “[t]he direction is what matters.”372
Whatever the success of local YIMBY campaigns, for the country as a
whole ensuring that zoning is done in a way that prioritizes the general
welfare requires that states exercise greater control over zoning. So, while
local exclusionary zoning seems to be an insurmountable obstacle to a
more inclusive society and regional zoning a utopian fantasy, academics,
in ways big and small, should nevertheless pursue such a goal. The second
century of zoning calls for waging the big fight for inclusion and not
conceding defeat when it comes to local zoning before the battle has been
fought. There is space politically to nudge the future of zoning away from
local dominance, but only if a push is made.
This Article has highlighted some of the academic work involved in a
push. Drawing out the harms of traditional exclusionary zoning helps lay
the foundation, and even if some of the examples are dated, the work of
informing successive generations of the long shadow of past harms
unfortunately never ends.373 Showing how states have used their authority
to limit local zoning is crucial if advocates are going to push back against

369. David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFF. L. REV.
5, 58–59 (2017).
370. David Barron, for example, labeled regionalism proposals as reliance on a “deus ex machina”
solution. David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement: A Metropolitan
Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701, 732 (2003).
371. Mangin, supra note 119, at 117.
372. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE
29 (1998).
373. Richard Rothstein’s The Color of Law is a prime example of such work: it combined beautiful
writing with in-depth historical research of both better and lesser-known examples of the way the law
advantaged whites and disadvantaged African-Americans and in so doing helped open up space to
challenge traditional property structures. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 301.
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the false notion that zoning is necessarily local.374 Details matter and at
some point nuanced discussion on what should be regional and what
should be done at the state-level will be important as well.375 One-sizefits-all approaches are not likely to succeed; political and scalar
differences across states mean that what is best handled through regional
zoning in one state should be done at a state-level in another and done by
localities subject to state imposed constraints in others. But it is important
that the momentum for change not get thwarted before it even gets a
chance to pick up steam. For now, it is enough to point in the general
direction: namely, that zoning’s second century should be marked by
increased state-preemption of local zoning.
Like most major changes, these are matters that are challenging.
Moving away from local zoning would introduce considerable uncertainty
and instability, but that may not be a bad thing.376 Most significantly, even
though the evidence so far suggests otherwise, across the board
deregulation to increase the supply of housing could lead to increased
gentrification in some areas. These are real concerns. But in light of the
existing economic and racial inequalities—acknowledged even by
supporters of the status quo—properly attributed to traditional zoning, the
burden of persuasion should be on those defending the traditional zoning
not on those challenging it.
The Euclid proviso provides a legal hook with which to correct for the
exclusionary nature of traditional zoning. In September 2020, the Open
Communities Alliance and Yale Law School’s Jerome N. Frank Legal
Services Organization filed a 145-page application for a zoning regulation
amendment to the town plan and zoning commission of Woodbridge,
Connecticut.377 The application formally is part of an effort to force
Woodbridge to allow the construction of an apartment building that would
provide affordable housing to residents seeking to live in the greater New
Haven area. But the submission, to the extent to which it challenges the
exclusionary heart of Woodbridge’s zoning plan, is more than that. The
work of Anika Singh Lemar and others, it is more accurately described as
a frontal assault on traditional zoning which relies, in part, on the Euclid
374. See Infranca, supra note 251; Lemar, supra note 257.
375. See Camacho & Marantz, supra note 60 (exploring the sorts of power reallocations between
state, regional, and local that are politically feasible); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Beyond the Double
Veto: Housing Plans as Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (2019)
(arguing that state and local compacts can push states to open up more space for development).
376. See Rosser, supra note 175.
377. Letter from Erin Boggs, Open Cmtys. All., & Anika Singh Lemar, Jerome N. Frank Legal
Servs. Org., to Robert Klee, Town Plan & Zoning Comm’n Chair, Town of Woodbridge (Sept. 29,
2020) [hereinafter Woodbridge Zoning Application] (on file with author) (Subject: Application to
Amend Woodbridge Zoning Regulations and Plan of Conservation and Development).
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proviso. As the submission notes, in 1991, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire used “the general welfare provision” of the state’s zoning
enabling act to block regulations that “placed an unreasonable barrier to
the development of affordable housing.”378 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, the New York Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts similarly have drawn on the Euclid proviso to strike
down overly restrictive local zoning.379 As the Massachusetts high court
noted, “[the] general welfare transcends one town’s ‘parochial
interests.’”380
The beauty of the Euclid proviso is that, in theory, its limitation on local
authority works in multiple directions. Today, the best hope for adding
vitality and bite to the proviso lies in statehouses, through legislative
action that preempts local exclusionary zoning and provides landowners
with greater density as a matter of right and simplifies development
permitting. But state-level legislative action need not foreclose greater
emphasis on the proviso by courts or even by local government officials
concerned that their exclusionary zoning practices are leaving the locality
vulnerable to legal challenge. In other words, though the focus of this
Article is on top-down rewriting of the zoning bargain reached by states
when they delegated authority to localities, local governments should also
pay attention to the proviso. There are hints that some cities are starting
to do just that.381 Exclusionary use dominated the last century of zoning.
It will take a broader view of general welfare from all levels and branches
of the government to increase the supply of housing.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, a progressive and ambitious approach to zoning must place
racial and economic desegregation front and center. While zoning plays a
significant role in how and where people live and work, it is too frequently
treated as an unimportant topic, a relative backwater of the law. By
elevating the relative attention given to zoning, making policymakers and
the public aware of its tremendous impact on peoples’ lived experiences,
there is more space to attack the exclusionary features of local zoning.
378. Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 494–96 (N.H. 1991).
379. Woodbridge Zoning Application, supra note 377, at 55–56.
380. Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley, 813 N.E.2d 843, 850 (Mass. 2004) (quoting Johnson v. Town
of Edgartown, 680 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Mass. 1997)).
381. See Laura Bliss, The Upzoning Wave Finally Catches Up to California, BLOOMBERG:
CITYLAB (Mar. 1, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-01/californi
a-turns-a-corner-on-single-family-zoning [https://perma.cc/SX4V-EGS2] (reporting that Berkeley
and Sacramento are moving away from single-family zoning and eliminating bans on multi-unit
residences).
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There is growing awareness among academics and policymakers that
rising inequality is tearing society apart and limiting the lives of large
parts of the population. State-level approaches to zoning, while radical in
light of the last century’s deference to locally-defined zoning, offer a
concrete way of fighting back against racial and class separation. That is
not to say that pushing the needle towards recognition of broader needs as
a way of combatting inequality will be accomplished immediately or
easily. The existing structure of locally-protected property rights provides
distinct advantages to privileged communities and they will have little
interest in moving towards a regional planning and zoning approach. But
to the extent to which society is at an inflection point as far as the balance
of power between suburbs and central cities, it is possible to advance
alternative approaches that reflect the fact that elites can reasonably see
both the city and suburb as attractive options. It will not be easy to lessen
the extent to which zoning is seen as a local prerogative but moving
towards a greater emphasis on the general welfare when it comes to
zoning and lowering the presumption in favor of local zoning is worth
pursuing as a theoretical and practical response to inequality.

